Revisional Authority cannot re-appreciate evidence to set aside concurrent findings of fact absent jurisdictional error or perversity.

The petitioner was appointed as the Village Kotwar of Charbhatha in 2012 by the Tahsildar under Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, following the death of her father, the previous incumbent.

Respondent No. 5 objected to this appointment, claiming the post for himself.

The appointment was upheld in both first and second appeals by the SDO and Additional Commissioner respectively.

After the petitioner had served for over ten years, the Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue, in a revision filed by Respondent No. 5, set aside the concurrent orders and remanded the matter to the Tahsildar for a fresh appointment process, citing procedural irregularities.

The petitioner challenged this revisional order via the present writ petition.

1. Whether the Board of Revenue exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence and upsetting concurrent findings of fact after a decade of the petitioner’s service.

2. Whether the appointment to the post of Kotwar is hereditary or governed strictly by the statutory procedure under the Code of 1959.

The court applied Section 230 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and the Rules framed thereunder, which establish that the post of Kotwar is a statutory position, not a hereditary one.

Rule 4(2) provides that preference may be given to a near relative of an ex-Kotwar only if "other things are equal," meaning it is a discretionary factor rather than a vested right.

Regarding judicial review, the court relied on *Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate* (2019) and *Union of India v. M.V. Mohanan Nair* (2020), which restrict the High Court’s interference under Article 226 to cases of patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate.

The Court observed that while the petitioner had served for ten years based on concurrent findings by lower authorities, the Board of Revenue possessed the statutory power to examine the "legality and propriety" of those orders.

The Court reasoned that the post of Kotwar is strictly statutory; thus, any appointment must satisfy the procedural mandates of Section 230, including valid Gram Sabha resolutions.

The Court found that the Board of Revenue did not act "wholly without jurisdiction" but rather sought to ensure strict procedural compliance.

Applying the principles of *M.V. Mohanan Nair*, the Court determined it could not substitute its own view for that of the revisional authority unless the order was "arbitrary or capricious."

Since the Board of Revenue merely remanded the matter for a fresh, lawful inquiry rather than appointing the Respondent, no manifest injustice or jurisdictional flaw was established that warranted the High Court's intervention.

The Court clarified that long-term service does not create an indefeasible right if the underlying appointment process requires fresh scrutiny under the Code.

The Tahsildar was directed to conclude the appointment process under Section 230 expeditiously and independently, without being influenced by previous observations on the merits of the candidates.