### Revisional Authority May Remand Matter for De Novo Enquiry if Appellate Findings Contradict Original Records

The petitioners challenged an order dated 17.10.2018 passed by the J&K Special Tribunal, which set aside a prior Appellate Authority order and remanded the matter to the Tehsildar, Kathua, for a de novo enquiry.

The dispute originated from Mutation Nos. 132 and 135 (attested in 1983-84), which granted ownership rights under Sections 4 and 8 of the J&K Agrarian Reforms Act to the petitioners and the respondents' father, Madho Lal, in equal shares.

The respondents (heirs of Madho Lal) challenged these mutations before the Commissioner, Agrarian Reforms (Appellate Authority), arguing procedural illegalities.

The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals, holding that Madho Lal had signed the mutations and never challenged them during his lifetime.

On revision, the Tribunal found that the Appellate Authority decided the matter without summoning the original record and ignored statutory violations.

1. Whether the J&K Special Tribunal exceeded its revisional jurisdiction under Section 21(2) of the Agrarian Reforms Act in the absence of a question of law or public interest.

2. Whether the Appellate Authority’s failure to examine the original record and the alleged violation of Standing Order 23-A/Rule 14 (attestation at headquarters instead of on-spot) constituted a legal error warranting remand.

The court applied Section 21(2) of the J&K Agrarian Reforms Act, which restricts revisional jurisdiction to cases involving a "question of law" or "public interest."

It relied on Rule 14 of the Agrarian Reforms Rules and Standing Order 23-A, which mandates that mutations must be attested "in or near the village" to which they pertain.

The court followed the principle from Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala that when a statute prescribes a manner for an act, it must be done in that manner or not at all.

Regarding condonation of delay, it applied the doctrine from Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran, stating that courts must ascertain "sufficient cause" before touching the merits of a case.

Finally, it cited Mohd. Nasir Ud Din v. Aftab Ahmad Khan to establish that writ courts should generally not interfere with remand orders that do not finally settle substantive rights.

The Court reasoned that the Tribunal properly exercised its revisional jurisdiction because "questions of law" were clearly present: specifically, the Appellate Authority’s failure to summon the original record and its disregard for Rule 14/Standing Order 23-A.

The Court noted a factual perversity where the Appellate Authority claimed Madho Lal "signed" the mutations, while the original record showed only "thumb impressions," proving the record was never actually scrutinized.

Furthermore, the Appellate Authority committed a procedural illegality by deciding the merits of the appeal on the same day it condoned the delay, without a separate inquiry into "sufficient cause."

Since the mutations were attested at headquarters rather than on-spot (violating Rule 14), the Tribunal’s decision to mandate a de novo enquiry was seen as a corrective measure for a manifest legal infirmity.

It held that the Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction as the violations of statutory procedure (Rule 14 and Standing Order 23-A) constituted substantial questions of law.

The Court further held that a remand order does not prejudice the petitioners' substantive rights, as they remain free to establish their claims during the Tehsildar's de novo enquiry.

The Registry was directed to return the records to the concerned authorities for immediate proceedings.