Revisional Jurisdiction Cannot Be Used to Reappreciate Fact-Based Concurrent Findings on Bona Fide Requirement

One Kamla Devi (landlady) filed a suit for eviction against the respondent-tenant under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, citing non-payment of rent and bona fide requirement for herself and her son, Madan Mohan.

The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority concurrently decreed eviction, finding the landlord's necessity proved despite the tenant's claim that the landlady's 80-year age rendered her business plans illusory and that she possessed another vacant shop.

During the pendency of proceedings, Kamla Devi and Madan Mohan passed away, and their legal representative (LRs) continued the suit.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana reversed the findings in its revisional jurisdiction, holding that the landlady had concealed the existence of a third shop (used for storage) and thus did not approach the court with clean hands.

1. Whether the requirement of the premises for the use of the son (Madan Mohan) survived after the death of the original landlady (Kamla Devi)?

2. Whether the High Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by reappreciating evidence and overturning concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide requirement?

The court primarily applied Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 regarding eviction for personal necessity.

It applied the doctrine of bona fide requirement as defined in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta, which distinguishes a "felt need" from "mere desire".

Regarding the scope of judicial review, the court relied on the principles from Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh and Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v. Tuffail Mohammed, which establish that under Section 115 of the CPC, a High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or set aside concurrent findings of fact unless they are perverse or suffer from jurisdictional error.

The Supreme Court observed that both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had verified the landlord's requirement as genuine, noting that while Kamla Devi had died, the necessity attached to her son Madan Mohan still subsisted.

The Court criticized the High Court for interfering with these factual findings based on the landlady's alleged "concealment" of a third shop.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the third shop was found to be used for storing garbage/waste material, and even if it were an "alternate accommodation," the choice of which premises best suits the landlord's need is a subjective choice that courts should respect.

The Court determined that the High Court erroneously acted as a court of first appeal by reappreciating evidence, which is prohibited under the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction unless the lower courts' orders are proved to be legally perverse.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the eviction orders of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority. The respondent-tenant was directed to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the shop to the appellant-landlords within a period of two months.