Revisional Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters Limited to Procedural Regularity and Prima Facie Credibility at Stage of Framing Charge

The Petitioner sought to set aside the Trial Court order dated 23.02.2024, which framed charges against him under Sections 376(2)(f)/506 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The prosecution alleged that between 01.10.2021 and 02.10.2021, the Petitioner forcefully established physical relations with a 13-year-old girl.

The Petitioner challenged the order on grounds of an 83-day delay in filing the FIR, lack of corroborative evidence, inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s statements, and a defense of alibi supported by CDR data.

Furthermore, the Petitioner claimed the FIR was a retaliatory measure regarding an unpaid loan owed to him by the prosecutrix's father.

1. Whether the Trial Court’s order framing charges suffered from any illegality, perversity, or patent error warranting interference under revisional jurisdiction.

2. Whether various defenses, such as delay in FIR, CDR analysis, and financial motives, can be adjudicated at the stage of framing of charge.

The court primarily applied Section 397 of the CrPC regarding revisional jurisdiction.

The court relied on the legal principles established in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap and State v. G. Easwaran, which dictate that framing of charge does not require a "mini-trial" or a determination of the likelihood of conviction, but only a prima facie satisfaction based on materials collected by the prosecution.

It further cited Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander & Anr., which clarifies that revisional jurisdiction is not to be exercised in a routine manner unless there is a patent error or perversity.

The High Court observed that at the stage of framing charges, the Trial Court is not required to undertake a "roving inquiry" into the merits of the evidence.

The Court found that the specific allegations by the minor prosecutrix, supported by statements under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC and her parents' testimony, established a prima facie case.

Regarding the Petitioner’s defenses—including the 83-day delay in the FIR, the CDR analysis showing him 8km away, and the alleged financial dispute—the Court reasoned that these are matters of trial and cannot be used to quash charges at this preliminary stage.

The Court emphasized that its revisional jurisdiction is limited and should not be used to substitute its own view for that of the Trial Court when sufficient grounds for proceeding exist.

The revision petition was dismissed.

The Court clarified that the observations made were only for the purpose of the revision petition and would not prejudice the Petitioner’s right to raise all contentions during the final trial.