Revisional jurisdiction under Land Revenue Act must be exercised within reasonable period despite absence of statutory limitation.

Mutation No. 4813 of Estate KP Bagh, Srinagar, was attested on 09.12.2004 regarding the inheritance of the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.

This mutation remained unchallenged for nearly twenty years until Respondent No. 4 filed a revision petition before the Financial Commissioner (Revenue) on 24.02.2021.

Respondent No. 4 alleged that the mutation was attested behind his back without notice to all legal heirs.

On 25.05.2023, the Financial Commissioner set aside the mutation and remanded the case for de novo consideration.

The petitioners challenged this order via a writ petition, arguing that the revisional power was exercised after an inordinate and unexplained delay.

1. Whether the revisional authority could exercise jurisdiction under Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act after an inordinate delay of nearly twenty years in the absence of a prescribed limitation period.

2. Whether a mere allegation of fraud or a "remand order" status justifies reopening a settled revenue entry after two decades without recording satisfaction regarding the delay.

The court primarily applied Section 15 of the Land Revenue Act, which grants revisional powers to the Financial Commissioner but contains no specific limitation period.

The court relied on the Supreme Court precedent in H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, which established that rules of limitation are based on public policy and courts should not keep a "Sword of Damocles" hanging over litigants indefinitely.

The court cited Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsingh Rao, which held that even discretionary power must be exercised within a "reasonable period" to avoid uncertainty.

The court cited Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, affirming that even in cases of fraud, revisional power must be invoked within a reasonable time from the date of discovery.

The court followed the Division Bench ruling in Wali Mohammad Magrey v. Ali Mohammad Gujree, which clarified that Section 15 revision petitions filed by aggrieved parties are indeed subject to the law of limitation.

The Court reasoned that while Section 15 does not specify a timeline, the "extraordinary lapse" of twenty years is per se unreasonable.

It observed that the Financial Commissioner failed to record any preliminary satisfaction regarding the sufficiency of the cause for delay or the lack of a condonation application.

The Court noted that during the twenty-year interval, third-party rights had crystallized, and the law of equity prevents the unsettling of long-standing fiscal entries like mutations.

The Court rejected the respondent's plea of "fraud," noting it was a bald allegation without specific particulars or proof.

It further held that describing an order as a "remand" does not insulate it from judicial review if it effectively revives a time-barred claim and disturbs settled positions.

The Court answered Issue 1 in the negative, stating that revisional power must ordinarily be exercised within three to five years.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the Financial Commissioner’s order dated 25.05.2023, and restored Mutation No. 4813 dated 09.12.2004.