Right of appeal is substantive; writ court cannot award compensation while statutory departmental appeal is pending.

The appellant, a former Vice Chancellor of LNIPE, was the subject of a 2019 sexual harassment complaint filed by a Yoga Instructor (Respondent No. 1) under the POSH Act, 2013

An Internal Complaint Committee (ICC) conducted an inquiry and submitted a report in September 2020 which indicated misconduct but did not suggest specific penal actions

The appellant claimed to have filed an administrative appeal against this report, which he asserted was still pending

Concurrently, the Writ Court entertained a petition by Respondent No. 1 and issued an order on July 15, 2025, awarding substantial monetary compensation against the appellant, the State, and the Institute

The appellant challenged this order, arguing that judicial findings of guilt during the pendency of a departmental appeal were premature and prejudicial

1. Whether the Writ Court erred in awarding compensation and effectively affirming findings of misconduct while a statutory departmental appeal against the ICC report was allegedly pending.

2. Whether the matter should be remanded to the departmental appellate authority to ensure the exhaustion of substantive administrative remedies.

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, specifically Section 18 regarding the right to appeal

Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, as the ICC acts as an inquiring authority thereunder

UGC Regulations, 2015

The core legal principle applied is that the right to appeal is a "substantive right," and departmental authorities should generally resolve factual disputes and apply their minds before final judicial intervention

The High Court observed that while the respondent contested the existence of a departmental appeal, the appellant provided electronic evidence suggesting it had been initiated in 2020

The Court reasoned that judicial observations regarding the "guilt" of the appellant or the imposition of heavy compensation packages by the Writ Court created a risk of prejudice while the administrative process was incomplete

It determined that the "tenure and texture" of the dispute necessitated a "threadbare" examination by the appropriate departmental authority (the Secretary, Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs) to ensure clarity on the factual matrix

By failing to wait for the appellate authority’s decision, the original writ order had bypassed the primary fact-finding and administrative review process

It remanded the matter to the Secretary, Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs, Government of India, directing all parties to appear before said authority on July 14, 2026. The appellate authority was ordered to provide a reasonable hearing and pass a final order within two months of the parties' first appearance. The writ appeal was disposed of accordingly.