RTI penalty and disciplinary recommendations require reasoned findings of persistent default and absence of reasonable cause.

The petitioner, an IPS officer serving as Regional Passport Officer (RPO) and Public Information Officer (PIO) in Ghaziabad, received an RTI application from Respondent No. 4 on March 26, 2006.

The application was initially returned due to a defect in the demand draft and was resubmitted on June 26, 2006.

Information was eventually furnished on December 19, 2006.

However, Respondent No. 4 filed a complaint under Section 18 of the RTI Act regarding the delay.

The Central Information Commission (CIC), vide order dated February 8, 2007, initiated penal action and recommended a time-bound inquiry and "strictest action" against the petitioner by the Ministry of External Affairs.

Despite a subsequent letter from the complainant stating the issue was resolved [six. 6] and a departmental inquiry report citing staff shortages and lack of mala fide intent.

The CIC passed a second order on March 19, 2007, imposing the maximum penalty of ₹25,000 and directing immediate disciplinary proceedings.

The court primarily applied Section 20 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which mandates that penalties for delays can only be imposed if the omission is "without any reasonable cause".

It relied on the Supreme Court precedent in Manohar v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 13 SCC 14, which established that "negligence per se" is insufficient for proceedings under Section 20(2); rather, there must be a reasoned finding that the default was persistent and without reasonable cause.

The court further held that the term "recommend" in Section 20(2) must be construed as "may" rather than "shall," preserving administrative discretion.

Additionally, the court noted the principle from Yudhister v. State Information Commission (2017) that "a hammer is not to be used to swat a fly" regarding the proportionality of penalties.

The court found that the CIC acted with "undue haste" by imposing the maximum penalty and recommending disciplinary action before the deadline for the departmental inquiry had expired.

The court noted that the inquiry report eventually cleared the petitioner, attributing the delay to institutional infrastructure problems—specifically staff shortages and high workloads—rather than personal misconduct.

The court underscored that the CIC's orders were laced with disparaging and "mortified" remarks about the petitioner’s status as an IPS officer, which demonstrated a pre-determined, hostile mindset rather than an objective adjudication of facts.

Furthermore, a prior Supreme Court ruling involving the same parties and similar circumstances had already established that delay without mala fide intent does not warrant a penalty.

Consequently, the jurisdictional facts required by Section 20 (absence of reasonable cause or persistence) were found to be missing.

The Court held that the CIC’s actions were arbitrary, contrary to law, and violated principles of natural justice due to evident bias.

It directively concluded that the exercise of power under Section 20 must be reasoned and proportionate, and the Commission cannot issue "binding" directions for dismissal or disciplinary action that override the discretion of administrative authorities.

No order as to costs was made.