Rule 32 labeling requirements do not apply to proprietary foods lacking prescribed standards.

On 16 July 2003, a Food Inspector of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation visited the respondent’s business premises and purchased three packets of “Sangita Brand” tamarind fruits for analysis in the presence of a panch witness.

The Public Analyst reported that the sample was misbranded under Section 2(ix)(k) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, as the packet allegedly did not contain particulars required under Rules 32(e), 32(f) and 32(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.

After obtaining sanction, the Corporation instituted Criminal Case No. 17 of 2004 for offences under Sections 7(ii) and 16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA Act.

The Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ahmedabad, acquitted the accused by judgment dated 17 October 2011. The Corporation preferred the present appeal under Section 378 CrPC against the acquittal.

Whether the trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 7(ii) and 16(1)(a)(i) of the PFA Act

Whether the prosecution proved that the tamarind product was required to comply with Rules 32(e), 32(f) and 32(i), or whether it was proprietary food governed by Rule 37-A

Whether the prosecution established, beyond reasonable doubt, the accused’s connection with the alleged misbranding and whether the acquittal was illegal, perverse or otherwise unsustainable

The Court applied Sections 7(ii) and 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which penalise the sale, storage or distribution of adulterated or misbranded food.

Section 2(ix)(k) concerns misbranding where the prescribed labelling requirements are not complied with.

Rules 32(e), (f) and (i) require specified declarations relating to batch or lot number, date of manufacture or packing, and the “best before” period, while Rule 37-A(2) governs proprietary food—food not standardised under the PFA Rules—and requires the name of the food or its category to be stated on the label.

The Court relied on Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Food Inspector , 2006 (1) SCC (Cri) 288, for the principle that food cannot be tested against standards prescribed for a different article and that prosecution based on inapplicable standards is unsustainable.

It also applied the appellate principles in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka , (2007) 4 SCC 415, reaffirmed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar , (2022) 3 SCC 471, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka , (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka , (2024) 9 SCC 169: an appellate court may reappreciate evidence in an acquittal appeal, but must respect the double presumption of innocence and should not interfere where two reasonable views are possible.

The Court found that the prosecution’s case was substantially based on the alleged absence of declarations under Rules 32(e), (f) and (i).

However, tamarind was treated as a proprietary food for which no specific standard had been prescribed; consequently, Rule 37-A, rather than the labelling requirements relied upon by the prosecution, governed the product.

The Court further noted that the prosecution failed to produce the relevant packet or label before the trial Court, thereby depriving the Court of primary evidence of misbranding, and that the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 materially contradicted each other regarding whether the sample was packed in a box or a glass bottle.

The Court also relied on the principle that a prosecution cannot be sustained by applying standards prescribed for another food article.

These deficiencies created reasonable doubt regarding both the alleged misbranding and the accused’s criminal liability.

Since the trial Court’s view was a reasonable one and was not shown to be perverse or manifestly illegal, the enhanced restraint applicable to an appeal against acquittal required affirmance of the judgment.

The trial Court had correctly appreciated the evidence and its acquittal did not suffer from illegality, infirmity or perversity.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, the judgment and order of acquittal dated 17 October 2011 were confirmed, the bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial Court.