Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of CCS (Pension) Rules bars disciplinary proceedings for events occurring over four years prior to institution.

The respondent, a former employee of the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), was accused of fraud for allegedly inducing a complainant to purchase a plot of land using a General Power of Attorney in January 2015

An FIR was subsequently registered

On January 20, 2017, the respondent was compulsorily retired under FR 56(j)

Following his retirement, the DDA issued a charge-sheet on April 4, 2018, under Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972

The respondent challenged the charge-sheet before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), arguing it was time-barred. The CAT quashed the proceedings on October 7, 2025

The DDA preferred this writ petition, contending that the limitation period should commence from the date the DDA acquired knowledge of the misconduct rather than the date of the event

1. Whether the four-year limitation period for instituting departmental proceedings against a retired employee under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules commences from the date of the alleged misconduct or the date the employer acquires knowledge of said misconduct.

Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, which prohibits the institution of departmental proceedings against a pensioner in respect of any event that took place more than four years before such institution

The precedent set by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Mohd. Idris Ansari, which held that proceedings are incompetent if the misconduct occurred prior to the four-year cutoff

The Division Bench ruling of the Delhi High Court in MCD v. Bhagwan Dass, which explicitly rejected the "date of knowledge" theory, holding that the plain language of the statute refers only to the date of the "event"

The Court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that the limitation period should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the complaint in 2015

Applying the literal rule of interpretation, the Court noted that Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) specifically uses the phrase "event which took place," and does not mention "date of knowledge"

The Court observed that since the alleged acts of fraud occurred in January 2015 and the charge-sheet was only issued on April 4, 2018, the DDA had technically acted within four years; however, because the respondent had already retired, the strict protections of Rule 9 applied

Based on Bhagwan Dass, the Court clarified that judicial intervention cannot dilute the express words of the Pension Rules to include a discovery rule that the legislature omitted

Consequently, the mere existence of an FIR or the timing of the DDA’s internal realization was legally irrelevant to the statutory bar

Finding no error in the Tribunal's judgment, the Court concluded that the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated ab initio for being time-barred. The writ petition was dismissed in limine