School admission-register entries lack probative value absent proof of their source or maker.

The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge (POCSO), Golaghat, in Special POCSO Case No. 50/2021 arising from Dergaon P.S. Case No. 188/2021, and was sentenced under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”).

The prosecution alleged that the appellant took the victim away on 7 May 2021 and committed penetrative sexual assault upon her, resulting in pregnancy.

The victim’s mother had stated that the victim was 16 years old, but admitted that she did not know the victim’s date of birth and had mentioned her age in the ejahar on assumption.

Although the school admission register recorded the victim’s date of birth, the person who made the entry and the source of the information were not examined.

Medical evidence placed the victim’s age above 16 and below 18 years and recorded a pregnancy of 13 weeks and 3 days on 13 May 2021.

The victim stated that she and the appellant were in love, had a consensual physical relationship, and that she went with him of her own free will after becoming pregnant.

Whether the school admission-register entry, without examination of the person who supplied or recorded the victim’s date of birth, was sufficient to prove that the victim was a minor at the relevant time.

Whether the radiological/ossification evidence showing the victim to be above 16 and below 18 years, after applying the permissible margin of error, established minority beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the error in the framing of the charge regarding the date of the alleged sexual assault and pregnancy occasioned prejudice or failure of justice to the appellant.

Whether the prosecution proved that the appellant committed penetrative sexual assault while the victim was a minor, so as to attract Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

The Court applied Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C., under which an error, omission, or irregularity in a charge does not invalidate the trial unless the accused was misled and a failure of justice was occasioned.

Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act was applied to hold that a school register is admissible, but its probative value depends upon proof of the basis of the recorded date of birth.

Relying on Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR 1988 SC 1796, State of Chhattisgarh v. Lekhram, (2006) 5 SCC 736, Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283, and Birka Shiva v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1454, the Court held that the person who supplied or recorded the date of birth should ordinarily be examined.

Under Mukarrab v. State of U.P., (2017) 2 SCC 210, ossification testing is not conclusive and carries a margin of approximately two years on either side.

The Court also referred to Yuvaprakash v. State of T.N., (2024) 17 SCC 684, and Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, concerning age determination in the absence of reliable birth records.

The central POCSO principle applied was that penetrative sexual intercourse must be proved to have occurred when the victim was below 18 years of age.

The Court held that the admission-register entry could not conclusively establish minority because neither the person who made the entry nor the person who furnished the date of birth was examined; moreover, the victim’s mother expressly stated that she did not know the victim’s date of birth.

The medical evidence placed the victim between 16 and 18 years, but, applying the recognised margin of error of two years and the rule that evidentiary ambiguity should benefit the accused, the Court treated her as being above 18 years at the relevant time.

The Court rejected the challenge based on defective charge framing because the appellant’s cross-examination demonstrated that he understood the prosecution case that he had sexually assaulted the victim and caused her pregnancy; therefore, no prejudice or failure of justice was established under Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C.

Finally, the victim’s evidence and her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement indicated a consensual relationship and that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant.

Since no specific date of first sexual intercourse was proved, the prosecution could not establish that the sexual act occurred while she was a minor.

The conviction under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act was set aside, the appellant was acquitted, and the respondents were directed to release him from custody forthwith unless he was required in any other case.

The appeal was accordingly allowed and the trial court record was directed to be returned.