School records and father’s admission of age negate the need for ossification tests in POCSO cases.

The appellant was convicted by the Special POCSO Court, Greater Bombay, on March 12, 2020, for the rape of his minor daughter.

The prosecution case originated from a statement by the victim (PW1) on July 27, 2018, following a "Police Didi" school counseling program.

PW1 alleged that the appellant had inappropriately touched her since age 10 and had sexually assaulted her at least four times in the three months preceding the FIR, with the last incident occurring on July 21, 2018.

The prosecution examined nine witnesses, including the school principal (PW7), who produced admission registers to prove the victim's date of birth as February 15, 2002.

The appellant contended that the victim was a major and had falsely implicated him due to anger over his decision to discontinue her studies.

Whether the prosecution successfully proved that the victim was a minor at the time of the offenses to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act.

Whether the sole testimony of the victim was of "sterling quality" to sustain a conviction without mechanical corroboration.

Whether the medical evidence (showing old hymenal tears and no fresh injuries) contradicted the oral testimony of the victim.

The Court primarily applied Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which mandates a hierarchical preference for school records/matriculation certificates over medical/ossification tests for age determination.

It relied on Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of U.P. and P. Yuvaprakash v. State to establish that Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872, gives primacy to public/official registers maintained in the discharge of duty.

Regarding the testimony of a sexual assault victim, the court applied the principle from State of H.P. v. Manga Singh, treating such testimony on par with an injured witness.

Finally, it applied Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC, noting that for offenses by persons in a position of trust, "imprisonment for life" signifies the remainder of the natural life.

The Court rejected the appellant's challenge to the victim's age, noting that the appellant himself had admitted the victim's date of birth (15.02.2002) in his Section 313 CrPC statement and in a prior school admission affidavit.

Under Section 94 of the JJ Act, the original school admission register produced by PW7 constituted "best evidence," rendering the inconclusive ossification test (estimating age at 17-18 years) irrelevant.

The Court found the victim’s (PW1) testimony "steadfast" and graphic, reaching the threshold of "sterling quality."

It dismissed the "false implication" theory, ruling it improbable that a child would level such scandalous allegations merely over discontinued studies.

Furthermore, the lack of fresh physical injuries was explained by the one-week gap between the last assault and the medical exam, which PW2 (Doctor) testified was sufficient for hymenal healing.

It held that the appellant, as a father, occupied a position of trust under Section 376(2)(f) IPC, and his actions constituted a "betrayal of the foundational fabric of familial trust."

The appeal was dismissed, and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life was upheld.