Second appeal cannot disturb factual findings absent perversity or a substantial question of law.

The respondent-plaintiff, the appellants’ uncle, claimed ownership of a residential house situated on Revenue Survey No. 79/Paiki-3 at Village Khilos, Jamnagar, asserting that it had fallen to his share under a family arrangement.

He alleged that, while he was away for work, the appellants took possession and refused to vacate, leading to Regular Civil Suit No. 350 of 2013 for possession.

The trial court held that the plaintiff was the owner and that the defendants had failed to prove ownership, but nevertheless dismissed the suit by judgment dated 08 April 2019.

In Regular Civil Appeal No. 27 of 2019, the Third Additional District Judge, Jamnagar, held that the suit ought to have been decreed once the plaintiff’s ownership was established and the defendants’ ownership claim failed.

The appellate court therefore allowed the appeal and directed the defendants to hand over peaceful and vacant possession by judgment dated 29 July 2026.

The defendants challenged that decision in the present second appeal, contending, inter alia, that the plaintiff had not proved title and that their long possession had matured into ownership by adverse possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether the second appeal raised any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Whether the first appellate court erred in decreeing possession after the trial court had found the plaintiff to be the owner and the defendants had failed to establish their ownership.

Whether the defendants could rely, at the second-appellate stage, on limitation and adverse possession under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 100 CPC restricts the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal to cases involving a substantial question of law; concurrent or factual findings of the courts below ordinarily cannot be disturbed unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, based on inadmissible evidence, or contrary to mandatory legal provisions.

The Court relied on Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, for the principle that even erroneous findings of fact do not justify interference in second appeal absent a clear error of law or perversity.

It also relied on Jaichand (Dead) through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, affirming that the High Court cannot substitute its view for that of the first appellate court unless the findings are contrary to mandatory law, based on inadmissible evidence, or rendered without evidence.

Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs suits for possession based on title and adverse possession, but a plea of adverse possession must be properly raised and proved in the proceedings.

The trial court’s findings that the plaintiff was the owner and that the defendants had failed to prove that the property had fallen to their share or that they were its exclusive owners were not challenged by the defendants through an appeal or cross-objection; those findings consequently became final and binding against them.

On that basis, the first appellate court correctly concluded that dismissal of the possession suit was inconsistent with the findings on ownership and non-proof of the defendants’ title.

The High Court found no perversity or gross error of law in that reasoning and therefore could not reassess the factual conclusions under Section 100 CPC.

The defendants’ limitation and adverse-possession argument was also rejected because it had not been pressed before the trial court in relation to a claim of title by adverse possession, and the defendants had failed to establish their ownership or lawful possession.

Accordingly, the proposed questions in the memorandum of appeal did not amount to substantial questions of law.

The second appeal was dismissed in limine, the appellate judgment and decree dated 29 July 2026 directing the defendants to deliver peaceful and vacant possession were confirmed, and no order as to costs was made.

The connected Civil Application for stay was disposed of as infructuous, and the Registry was directed to draw the decree accordingly.