Second FIR and subsequent Section 156(3) CrPC application maintainable if previous dismissal was not on merits.

The petitioner, a clerk at the Municipal Corporation, Gonda, sought the quashing of F.I.R. No. 189/2026 lodged against him for misappropriation of Provident Fund (PF) amounts under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC

Previously, a different F.I.R. (No. 955/2020) had been lodged by the Executive Officer regarding PF irregularities against other employees, where the petitioner was not named

Respondent No. 4 (Ayesha Begum) filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. specifically alleging the theft of Rs. 1,50,000 from her account

Her first application was dismissed for want of prosecution on July 29, 2025

She subsequently filed a second application under Section 173(4) of the BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.), which led to the impugned F.I.R.

a second F.I.R. is permissible if it pertains to a different incident or crime, even if arising from the same set of circumstances, as established in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore (2025) and Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004)

there is no statutory bar to a second complaint if the first was dismissed on technical grounds rather than on merits, as held in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar (1962), Samta Naidu v. State of M.P. (2020), and Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury v. The State of Assam (2024)

The court reasoned that the 2020 F.I.R. did not cover the specific allegations of Respondent No. 4 regarding the forgery and withdrawal of her specific PF funds, nor was the petitioner’s role investigated in that instance

Since the version in the second F.I.R. involved distinct transactions and different check periods, it constituted a separate offence

Regarding the procedural challenge, the court noted that the first 156(3) application was dismissed for "want of prosecution" (non-appearance) and not on "merits"

Citing Subrata Choudhury, the court found that since the complainant disclosed the prior dismissal in her second application, the second filing was legally maintainable as it did not violate the principle of finality associated with decisions on merit

The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the subsequent F.I.R. was valid as it addressed distinct criminal acts not covered by the first investigation. It further held that the second application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was maintainable because the earlier dismissal was for default of appearance and not handled on merits. No relief against arrest or coercive measures was granted.