Section 11 scrutiny is confined to prima facie existence of arbitration agreement, excluding "accord and satisfaction" claims.

The Petitioner sought the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, based on Clause 8 of a Memorandum of Understanding cum Agreement dated 02.02.2022

The Petitioner served a Section 21 notice on 08.05.2024

Simultaneously, the Petitioner filed a Section 9 petition seeking interim injunctions to restrain the Respondents from alienating or developing land in Sampla, Haryana, and from altering the Board of Directors or shareholding of Respondent No. 1

The Respondents expressed "no objection" to the matter being referred to arbitration

1. Whether the Court should appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) when the existence of an arbitration agreement is undisputed

2. Whether a pending Section 9 petition for interim relief should be transitioned to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 once the Tribunal is constituted

The Court primarily applied Section 11(6) and Section 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which limits judicial intervention to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement

It relied heavily on the precedent *SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning*, which established that the Referral Court must only conduct a *prima facie* scrutiny of the agreement's existence and leave "accord and satisfaction" or "ex-facie meritless" claims to the Tribunal

The Court also referenced *In re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899* regarding the limited scope of enquiry at the referral stage

The Court observed that under the current legal landscape defined by *Krish Spinning*, the judicial role at the Section 11 stage is facilitative and procedural rather than adjudicatory

Since the parties admitted to the existence of Clause 8 in the Agreement (which specified Delhi as the seat and required a retired Judge as the arbitrator) and the Respondents raised no objection, the Court found the *prima facie* requirement for referral satisfied

Regarding the interim relief sought under Section 9, the Court determined that since an arbitrator was being appointed, the principle of arbitral autonomy required the Section 9 petition to be treated as a Section 17 application for the Tribunal's consideration, thereby maintaining the legislative intent of minimum judicial interference

It held that all contentions, including jurisdictional objections and "accord and satisfaction," remain open for the Arbitrator's decision

The Section 9 petition was disposed of with directions to be treated as a Section 17 application before the Arbitrator, and the interim order dated 27.05.2024 was extended until the Arbitrator adjudicates the Section 17 application