Section 14 cannot extend PMLA’s 120-day outer limit absent bona fide prosecution of the same matter.

The petitioner had purchased 67 windmills that were provisionally attached in proceedings arising from an Enforcement Case Information Report connected with a CBI predicate-offence case. The Adjudicating Authority confirmed the attachment on 27.01.2023, and the petitioner’s appeal under Section 26 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PML Act”) was subsequently dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal on 03.02.2026.

Before the Tribunal’s final order, the petitioner had filed W.P.No.12964 of 2025 before the Madras High Court seeking permission to operate the windmills. The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to seek an early hearing before the Tribunal; the petitioner did not file such an application, although the Tribunal proceeded to hear and dismiss the appeal.

Instead of challenging the Tribunal’s order under Section 42 of the PML Act within 60 days, the petitioner filed an SLP before the Supreme Court on 13.04.2026 challenging only the High Court’s writ order. The 60-day limitation for filing the statutory appeal expired on 04.04.2026.

The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP as withdrawn on 11.05.2026, granting liberty to challenge the Tribunal’s final order in appropriate proceedings.

The petitioner filed the Section 42 appeal on 29.06.2026, along with an application seeking condonation of an 86-day delay. It sought exclusion of the period from 13.04.2026 to 11.05.2026 under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, contending that the effective delay would thereby be reduced to 58 days.

The Directorate of Enforcement opposed the application, arguing that Section 42 prescribed an outer limit of 120 days and that the Supreme Court proceedings did not concern the Tribunal’s final order.

1. Whether the period spent prosecuting the SLP before the Supreme Court could be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for computing limitation under Section 42 of the PML Act?

2. Whether the High Court could condone the delay and entertain the appeal filed beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under Section 42 of the PML Act?

3. Whether the liberty granted by the Supreme Court to challenge the Tribunal’s order automatically extended or revived the statutory limitation period?

Section 42 of the PML Act requires an appeal from an Appellate Tribunal order to be filed within 60 days and permits the High Court, upon sufficient cause, to allow filing within a further period not exceeding 60 days, thereby creating a maximum period of 120 days.

By virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Sections 4–24 apply to special enactments unless expressly excluded; however, Section 5 cannot be used to condone delay beyond a statutory outer limit expressed as “not exceeding”.

Section 14 permits exclusion of time spent prosecuting an earlier civil proceeding in good faith and with due diligence, before a court unable to entertain it because of a defect of jurisdiction or like cause, provided the earlier and later proceedings concern the same matter in issue.

The Court relied on Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169, and Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 401, for the five cumulative requirements of Section 14; on Ketan V. Parekh v. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement, (2011) 15 SCC 30, Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. CERC, (2010) 5 SCC 23, and Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, for the strict outer limitation principle; and on Arifa v. Abhiman Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (2025) 10 SCC 700, for the rule that liberty to institute appropriate proceedings does not override limitation.

The Court held that the requirements of Section 14 were not satisfied. The SLP challenged only the High Court’s order concerning operation of the windmills and early hearing before the Tribunal; it did not challenge the Tribunal’s final order dated 03.02.2026, which was the subject matter of the later Section 42 appeal.

Consequently, the earlier and subsequent proceedings did not relate to the same matter in issue. The petitioner also failed to act with due diligence because it knowingly allowed the 60-day period to expire, chose to pursue an unrelated SLP, and waited a further 49 days after the SLP was withdrawn before filing the statutory appeal.

The Court therefore declined to exclude the period spent before the Supreme Court under Section 14.

The Court further found that the appeal was filed 146 days after the Tribunal’s order, whereas the initial limitation expired on 04.04.2026 and the maximum condonable period expired on 04.06.2026.

Section 5 could not be invoked to extend this statutory outer limit. The Supreme Court’s grant of liberty merely permitted the petitioner to pursue an appropriate remedy; it did not extend, revive, or dispense with the limitation prescribed under Section 42.

The appeal, filed beyond the absolute 120-day period under Section 42 of the PML Act, was not maintainable.

Accordingly, C.M.P.No.17568 of 2026 seeking condonation of delay was dismissed, and C.M.A.SR.No.106394 of 2026 was rejected, with no order as to costs.