Section 164 CrPC statements of unexamined deceased witnesses cannot constitute substantive evidence.

The appellant was prosecuted for the murder of Manda Swapna, whose decomposed body was found near Bandam Bore, Vengalapur village.

The medical evidence indicated death by strangulation.

The prosecution alleged that the deceased was in a relationship with the appellant, had travelled by bus to meet him, and was received by him before being taken to the place of occurrence.

The prosecution relied principally on the statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of the bus driver and conductor, who died before being examined at trial, the identification proceedings, the alleged recovery of a towel at the appellant’s instance, and evidence concerning the relationship between the appellant and the deceased.

The Principal District and Sessions Judge, Jagtial, convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and three years’ simple imprisonment, respectively.

The appellant challenged the conviction in the present appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased died homicidally and that the appellant caused her death by strangulation, thereby committing an offence under Section 302 IPC?

Whether the prosecution established that the appellant caused disappearance of evidence or gave false information with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, thereby committing an offence under Section 201 IPC?

Whether the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial Court warranted interference in appeal?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 201 IPC, requiring proof respectively of murder and of causing disappearance of evidence or giving false information with the requisite intention.

It held that a statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is ordinarily not substantive evidence and may be used for corroboration or contradiction; where the maker is not examined before the Court, the statement cannot ordinarily be treated as substantive proof of its contents.

Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, only that portion of information supplied by an accused in custody which distinctly relates to a fact discovered is admissible; recovery of an object alone does not establish its connection with the offence.

The Court also applied the five principles governing circumstantial evidence in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116: the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with guilt, conclusive, exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and form a complete chain showing that the offence was committed by the accused.

It further recognised that a Test Identification Parade is not a substitute for substantive testimony and that medical evidence proving the cause of death does not, by itself, identify the assailant.

The Court accepted that the deceased died an unnatural and homicidal death by strangulation, but held that this fact did not identify the perpetrator.

The evidence of P.Ws.5 and 7 established only that the appellant and deceased were acquainted and intended to marry; it did not prove that they were together immediately before the death.

The bus driver’s and conductor’s Section 164 Cr.P.C. statements could not be treated as substantive evidence because both witnesses died before entering the witness box, and the Magistrate who recorded the statements could prove only their recording, not the truth of their contents.

The identification proceedings likewise could not cure the absence of substantive testimony.

Even assuming that the towel was recovered at the appellant’s instance, the prosecution failed to establish that it belonged to the appellant, was the towel used in the strangulation, or contained any biological or other incriminating material connecting it with the deceased.

Consequently, the essential last-seen and recovery links were missing, and the chain of circumstances did not exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence.

Since the prosecution failed to prove the murder charge, and also failed to establish that the appellant caused disappearance of evidence with the requisite intent, the conviction under Section 201 IPC was also unsustainable.

The appeal was allowed; the judgment dated 30 May 2025 in S.C.No.04 of 2021 was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of the offences under Sections 302 and 201 IPC by extending the benefit of doubt.

He was directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.