Section 18’s anticipatory-bail bar does not apply absent a prima facie SC/ST Act offence.

The appellant, the de facto complainant and a member of the Hindu Pulaya Scheduled Caste community, alleged that on 5 January 2026 she and her husband were assaulted by the respondents while returning from a church festival. She alleged that the accused used sexually coloured caste slurs, physically assaulted her husband and his friends, touched her breast, and tore her dress. The prosecution invoked Sections 115(2), 118(2), 74, 76, 351(2) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”).

The incident arose in the context of an earlier counter-case, Crime No. 10/2026, registered against the appellant, her husband and others. The appellant claimed to have submitted complaints to the police and other authorities, but Crime No. 177/2026 was registered only on 13 April 2026 after the Supreme Court questioned the failure of the police to register a case on her complaint.

The Special Court granted anticipatory bail to respondents 2 to 6 on the ground that no offence under the SC/ST Act was prima facie made out. The de facto complainant challenged that order before the High Court.

During the appeal, the Assistant Commissioner of Police submitted a report stating that the investigation had not produced evidence substantiating the incident as described in the First Information Statement. The report also referred to inconsistencies regarding the time and place of occurrence, the number of assailants, the nature of the injuries, and the contents of the appellant’s earlier complaint.

The Court applied Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, which bars anticipatory bail where a prima facie offence under the Act is disclosed.

It held that where the prosecution materials prima facie establish an offence under the SC/ST Act, the statutory bar operates.

The Court further applied Section 3(2)(va), under which commission of an offence specified in the Schedule to the SC/ST Act, against a person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, with the requisite knowledge of that status, attracts the additional offence under the Act.

It observed that an offence under Section 74 of the BNS, corresponding to the offence of assault or use of criminal force against a woman with intent to outrage her modesty, would attract Section 3(2)(va) when the statutory requirements are prima facie established.

The Court relied on Xxxx v. State of Kerala, 2022 (6) KHC 672, concerning the prima facie application of Sections 3(1)(w)(i) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act; Biju Abraham v. State of Kerala, 2025 (1) KHC 721, on the scope of a woman’s modesty; and Kiran v. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain, 2025 KHC Online 6765, on the jurisdictional error in granting anticipatory bail by disregarding the bar under Section 18.

The Court accepted that, as a matter of law, a prima facie case under the SC/ST Act would prevent the grant of anticipatory bail under Section 18, and that a proved-at-the-threshold offence under Section 74 of the BNS could attract Section 3(2)(va).

However, the decisive consideration was the state of the investigation. The Assistant Commissioner’s report stated that no evidence had been obtained to substantiate the incident in the manner alleged in the First Information Statement.

The report also recorded material discrepancies: the appellant and witnesses alleged an assault by six persons at about 1:00 a.m., whereas the medical history referred to an assault by three identifiable persons at about 3:00 a.m.; the alleged use of sticks, helmets and beer bottles was inconsistent with the minor injuries recorded; the earlier complaint did not refer to offences under the SC/ST Act; and the alleged place of occurrence was not supported by local witness statements.

In light of these investigative findings, the Court held that the prosecution had not established a prima facie case sufficient to activate the Section 18 bar.

Consequently, the legal principles relied upon by the appellant did not warrant cancellation of the anticipatory bail granted by the Special Court.

The Court therefore found no reason to interfere with the Special Court’s order dated 17 June 2026 granting anticipatory bail to respondents 2 to 6. The criminal appeal was dismissed.