Section 25-B(8) revision cannot introduce a new jurisdictional objection based on unpleaded facts.

The Respondent No. 1, Khandelwal Jain Society, filed an eviction petition under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”) before the learned Rent Controller, seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.

The Petitioner’s application for leave to defend was dismissed by order dated 14 August 2025, followed by an eviction order dated 30 August 2025 in RC ARC No. 39/19.

Before the High Court, the Petitioner expressly abandoned the challenge to the order dated 14 August 2025 and confined the revision to the eviction order.

The Petitioner contended that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction because the Respondent was a lessee under the Government Grants Act, 1895, and relied on a Government lease and on Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh.

The Petitioner also alleged that the Respondent possessed sufficient alternative accommodation, vacant land, and other premises capable of satisfying its claimed requirement.

The Court applied Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over the Rent Controller’s decision and does not act as an appellate court.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, the Court held that interference is warranted only for an error apparent on the face of the record, absence of adjudication, jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or a wholly unreasonable conclusion; the High Court cannot substitute its own view merely because another view is possible.

The Court also relied on Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover on the restricted scope of revision under Section 25-B(8).

The Court considered Union of India v. Sir Sobha Singh, which dealt with the applicability of the DRC Act to premises covered by a Government grant, but held that its ratio did not assist the Petitioner on the materially different facts of the present case.

The Court rejected the jurisdictional objection because the Petitioner was not the original lessee under the Government of India; rather, he claimed tenancy under the Respondent, which itself was the Government lessee.

Accordingly, Sir Sobha Singh, concerning the original lessee-lessor relationship, was factually distinguishable.

Further, the objection had never been pleaded or urged before the Rent Controller, and raising it in revision would require introduction of a new factual foundation, impermissible within the limited scope of Section 25-B(8).

On alternative accommodation, the Court found that the Rent Controller had considered the alleged vacant land, hall, and individual residential premises.

The Rent Controller correctly distinguished between vacant open land and the covered accommodation allegedly required by the Respondent, and noted the absence of photographs, rent receipts, site plans, MCD records, or other supporting documents establishing that the premises were vacant, suitable, usable, and available.

The Respondent had provided specific explanations regarding the status of each premises, including existing tenancies, pending litigation, lack of possession, or other impediments.

Since the Rent Controller had considered the material pleas and reached a reasoned conclusion, no permissible ground for revisional interference was made out.

It further held that the allegations concerning alternative accommodation were unsupported by cogent material and did not raise a triable issue.

Finding no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or error apparent on the face of the record, the Court dismissed RC.REV. 401/2025 and disposed of all pending applications.