Section 25-B(8) revision cannot reassess bona fide need absent jurisdictional error or perversity.

The tenant/petitioner challenged, under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), the Eviction Order dated 18.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller in RC ARC No. 617/2024.

The tenant’s application for leave to defend had been rejected and eviction was ordered from shop/property bearing No. 6926-33/10A, Ground Floor, part of M/s Laxmi Chand Jaipuria Spinning and Weaving Mills, Kolhapur Road, Subzi Mandi, Delhi.

The respondents-landlords claimed bona fide requirement of the premises for two purposes: enabling their daughter, who was in the final year of graduation and already giving tuitions, to establish a tuition/coaching centre, and establishing a lawyers’ office for themselves.

The tenant contended that the daughter’s requirement was premature and that the respondents already possessed Chambers Nos. 408-A, 409-A and 420-A at Tis Hazari Courts, making the disputed premises merely additional or more convenient accommodation.

The ARC rejected these objections and held that no triable issue arose regarding bona fide requirement or alternative accommodation.

1. Whether the respondents’ asserted requirement of the premises for their daughter’s proposed tuition/coaching centre, notwithstanding that she was still pursuing her studies, disclosed a bona fide requirement and raised a triable issue warranting leave to defend?

2. Whether the respondents’ existing chambers at Tis Hazari Courts constituted reasonably suitable alternative accommodation, such that their requirement of the disputed premises for a lawyers’ office was not bona fide?

3. Whether the ARC’s refusal to grant leave to defend disclosed a jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity, or other ground warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act?

The Court applied Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, which permits eviction where premises are bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by the landlord or a dependent family member and no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation is available.

It applied the limited revisional standard under the proviso to Section 25-B(8), holding that the High Court exercises supervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction and cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view unless the ARC’s decision suffers from jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record.

This principle was drawn from Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30; Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati, 2024:DHC:9322; and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285.

Relying on Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behl, AIR 2002 SC 2256, the Court recognised that the landlord’s bona fide requirement may include the need to settle a closely connected family member and enable that person to become economically independent.

It further relied on Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222, for the principle that alternative accommodation must be assessed in light of factors such as location, accessibility, size and purpose.

Section 19 of the DRC Act was also noted as providing a remedy if the premises are not used for the stated purpose or are re-let within the statutory period.

The Court held that the daughter’s continuing education did not, by itself, negate the bona fide nature of the requirement, particularly because she was in the final year of graduation and was already giving tuitions.

The requirement was supported by the familial and economic-settlement principle recognised in Joginder Pal and was not merely a bald assertion.

Regarding the lawyers’ office, the respondents had disclosed their existing Tis Hazari chambers but explained that those chambers were unsuitable for late-hour work, lacked amenities after 6:00 p.m., and were inconvenient for clients during evening hours.

The disputed premises, situated in a market area and centrally located between the Rohini and Tis Hazari Courts, could reasonably be found more suitable for the stated professional use.

The existence of other premises did not automatically defeat the claim, since suitability depends on the nature, location, accessibility and purpose of the proposed use.

Applying the restricted scope of revision under Section 25-B(8), the Court declined to reassess the evidence or substitute its view for that of the ARC, finding that the ARC’s conclusions were supported by the pleadings and material on record and were neither perverse nor jurisdictionally defective.

It held that the respondents had established a genuine and bona fide requirement for the premises for their daughter’s tuition/coaching activity and for their own lawyers’ office, and that the tenant had failed to disclose any triable issue concerning bona fide need or reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

Finding no jurisdictional error, perversity, material irregularity or other ground for revisional interference, the High Court dismissed RC.REV. 295/2026 and disposed of the pending applications; there was no order as to costs.