Section 29A permits post-expiry extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon sufficient cause beyond the applicant’s control.

SAP India Private Limited (“Petitioner”) had invoked arbitration against Cox and Kings Limited (“Respondent”) in respect of unpaid amounts under a software and implementation contract.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s order dated 2 January 2019, a three-member tribunal presided over by Justice Madan Lokur was constituted.

SAP filed its Statement of Claim, while the Respondent filed a Counter-claim.

After the pleadings were completed, the Respondent was admitted into CIRP on 22 October 2019, triggering the Section 14 moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; consequently, the Justice Lokur Tribunal adjourned the proceedings sine die on 5 November 2019.

The Respondent subsequently invoked a fresh arbitration against SAP and its parent company, SAP SE.

The Supreme Court appointed Justice Mohit Shah as sole arbitrator on 9 September 2024, leaving SAP’s jurisdictional objections open.

SAP unsuccessfully challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal before that Tribunal, the Bombay High Court and the Supreme Court; its SLP was dismissed on 23 January 2026.

SAP thereafter sought resumption of the proceedings before the Justice Lokur Tribunal.

The Respondent opposed the request, contending that the tribunal was functus officio, that SAP had failed to show sufficient cause under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and that SAP’s claim had been admitted in the liquidation process.

The Justice Lokur Tribunal directed SAP to approach the High Court for an extension of its mandate.

Whether the Court could extend the mandate of the Justice Lokur Tribunal under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, despite the expiry of the prescribed period.

Whether SAP had demonstrated “sufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) for extending the tribunal’s mandate.

Whether the Respondent’s CIRP, the resulting moratorium, the subsequent constitution of the Justice Shah Tribunal, and SAP’s pursuit of jurisdictional challenges constituted circumstances beyond SAP’s control and negated any allegation of deliberate delay or “fence-sitting”.

Whether the Respondent’s liquidation, admission of SAP’s claim by the Liquidator, or the possibility of inconsistent findings justified refusing an extension.

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits the Court to extend the time for making an arbitral award, including after expiry of the statutory or consensually extended period, provided sufficient cause is shown.

The Court relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. for the maintainability of an extension application filed after expiry of the mandate.

It relied on C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera for the principle that extension under Section 29A is discretionary and must not be granted mechanically.

It further applied Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager for the proposition that “sufficient cause” must be assessed consistently with arbitration’s underlying objective of effective resolution of disputes through the agreed mechanism, particularly where delay is not attributable to wilful or negligent default.

The Court distinguished Rajendra Kumar v. National Highways Authority of India and Bilkish Mohammed Umar Khatri v. Sarabjit Singh Arora, where extension was refused because the delay was unexplained.

It also considered Regulation 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, which recognises mutual credits and set-offs in liquidation.

The Court held that the proceedings were interrupted after completion of pleadings because the Respondent entered CIRP and became subject to the statutory moratorium, rather than because of any default by SAP or the tribunal.

The Respondent then pursued substantially the same dispute before the Justice Shah Tribunal.

Since the Supreme Court had expressly preserved SAP’s right to raise jurisdictional objections, SAP was justified in pursuing those objections before the Justice Shah Tribunal and thereafter before the High Court and Supreme Court.

SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal shortly after the Supreme Court dismissed its SLP, demonstrating that it had not abandoned the original arbitration or acted as a “fence-sitter”.

The Court also found that refusing an extension would effectively prevent SAP’s claim from being adjudicated: the Respondent had withdrawn its Counter-claim from the Justice Lokur arbitration while opposing continuation of that arbitration on the basis that SAP’s claim had been dealt with in liquidation.

The Liquidator’s admission of the claim at a nominal value did not conclusively determine the claim’s merits or quantum, and issues concerning liquidation, set-off and enforceability could be raised before the tribunal.

These matters therefore did not negate sufficient cause under Section 29A(5).

In the circumstances, the delay was not deliberate, wilful or negligent, and denying an extension would defeat the purpose of arbitration.

The Petition was allowed, and the time for the tribunal to make an award was extended by one year, commencing from the date on which a copy of the order was uploaded.

There was no order as to costs.