Section 29A’s time limit does not apply to pre-2015 arbitral proceedings continued after remand.

The appellant contractor agreed to construct a house for respondent no. 1, with respondent no. 2 acting as architect and consultant.

After the work was completed and a completion certificate issued, respondent no. 1 alleged defects, deficiencies and delay.

The first arbitral award rejected respondent no. 1’s claims and allowed part of the contractor’s counterclaim.

On respondent no. 1’s challenge, the High Court set that award aside and remitted the dispute for fresh adjudication following an inspection by a government-approved architect appointed as Local Commissioner (LC).

After considering the LC’s report, the arbitrator made a fresh award in respondent no. 1’s favour, including amounts for alleged deficiencies, mental agony and costs, with future interest.

The Commercial Court dismissed the contractor’s Section 34 challenge, but reduced future interest from 18% to 10%.

The contractor appealed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

1. Whether the Commercial Court’s refusal to set aside the arbitral findings on alleged defects, deficiencies and the adjustment for wood warranted interference under Section 37.

2. Whether the award of Rs. 22,500 for delayed possession was beyond the claims made and therefore liable to be set aside.

3. Whether the award of Rs. 1,00,000 for mental harassment was impermissibly inconsistent with the earlier award.

4. Whether the award was void because it was not made within six months of receipt of the LC’s report, including whether Section 29A applied.

Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 confine judicial review of arbitral awards; Section 37 does not permit an independent reassessment of the merits and is narrower than Section 34, with the appellate court principally examining whether the Section 34 court exercised its jurisdiction within permissible limits [*MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.*, (2019) 4 SCC 163; *UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P.*, (2022) 4 SCC 116].

A reasonable interpretation of the contract or factual finding by the arbitrator is not ordinarily disturbed; patent illegality must go to the root of the matter, and trivial error is insufficient [*Larsen Air Conditioning & Refrigeration Co. v. Union of India*, (2023) 15 SCC 472].

Section 29A, introduced by the 2015 amendment, was held inapplicable to these arbitral proceedings, which commenced in 2012; the remand for fresh adjudication continued the original proceedings.

The court relied on the transitional approach in *BCCI v. Kochi Cricket (P) Ltd.*, (2018) 6 SCC 287.

The court held that the completion certificate established compliance with statutory requirements, not that the construction conformed to the parties’ contract; the delay in raising objections did not, on the facts, defeat respondent no. 1’s claim.

The challenge to the Rs. 22,500 award had not been specifically raised under Section 34, and the court found no basis to interfere with it under Section 37.

The arbitrator’s finding that respondent no. 1 supplied the wood, and the resulting adjustment against the contractor’s bill, was factual and did not warrant appellate reappraisal.

The earlier award had been set aside, so it could not establish inconsistency with the fresh award of damages for mental harassment.

Finally, the six-month direction following remand was not an inflexible limit whose expiry terminated the arbitrator’s mandate; the objection had also not been pleaded under Section 34.

Because the original proceedings commenced before the 2015 amendment, Section 29A did not apply.

The pending application was also dismissed.