Section 319 CrPC permits summoning exonerated persons where trial testimony supplies strong and cogent evidence.

The revisions challenged the order dated 23 June 2026 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Auraiya, in S.T. No. 149 of 2024 arising from Case Crime No. 182 of 2023, under Sections 147 and 302 IPC, Police Station Auraiya.

The FIR named ten accused persons, including the revisionists—Ankit, Anshu alias Dinesh Singh, Neelu Singh and Gulshan—but, after investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet against only six persons and did not charge-sheet the revisionists.

During trial, PW-1 Uma Devi alias Usha Devi and PW-2 Narendra Singh were examined as witnesses of fact.

On the basis of their depositions, the trial court exercised power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and summoned the revisionists to face trial with the other accused persons.

Whether the trial court lawfully exercised its power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the revisionists on the basis of the depositions of PW-1 and PW-2, despite their having been excluded from the police charge-sheet?

Whether the evidence recorded during trial constituted the “strong and cogent evidence” required for invoking the extraordinary power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.?

Whether the alleged inconsistencies or lack of support during cross-examination, and the trial court’s non-consideration of the case diary, rendered the summoning order illegal or perverse?

Section 319 Cr.P.C. empowers a court, during an inquiry or trial, to proceed against a person who is not already an accused where evidence before the court indicates that such person appears to have committed an offence and could be tried together with the existing accused.

The power is discretionary and extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly, only on the basis of strong and cogent evidence, rather than mere probability of complicity, as held in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2014 SC 1400.

Although the evidence need not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, it must be stronger than the prima facie standard applicable at the stage of framing charge and should be of such quality that, if unrebutted, it could lead to conviction.

The court may rely on evidence recorded during the trial, and a police decision not to charge-sheet a person does not bar subsequent exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The court also referred to Sarabjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2009 (16) SCC 46, and Brijendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2017 (7) SCC 706, as reiterating these principles.

The High Court held that the revisionists’ exclusion from the police charge-sheet did not restrict the trial court’s jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C., because the relevant material for exercising that power was the evidence recorded before the court, not merely the case diary or the conclusions of the Investigating Officer.

PW-1 and PW-2, treated as eyewitnesses, assigned specific overt acts and active participation to the revisionists.

The High Court found that their testimony went beyond a mere possibility of involvement and, if left unrebutted, could potentially support a conviction, thereby satisfying the “strong and cogent evidence” threshold prescribed in Hardeep Singh.

The argument that the witnesses did not support the prosecution during cross-examination was rejected because, on an examination of the trial record, the essential part of their testimony implicating the revisionists remained intact.

The court further held that no mini-trial or final determination of guilt was required at the summoning stage.

The summoning order dated 23 June 2026 was found to be reasoned, legally sustainable, and free from patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error.

Criminal Revision Nos. 4871 of 2026 and 4962 of 2026 were accordingly dismissed.

The court clarified that its observations were confined to disposal of the revisions and would not influence the trial on merits.