Section 33(2)(b) approval cannot stand where domestic enquiry findings are perverse and unsupported by evidence.

Dalbir Singh was employed as a conductor with the Delhi Transport Corporation (“DTC”) from 24 May 1977.

On 30 March 1991, DTC alleged that, while conducting a bus, he collected ₹7 for two journeys from Loni Road Crossing to Ghaziabad but issued two lower-value tickets of ₹2.50 each from U.P. Border to Ghaziabad.

A departmental enquiry found the charge proved, and DTC terminated his services on 23 December 1991.

Since an industrial dispute concerning DTC employees was pending, DTC simultaneously sought approval of the termination under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”).

The Industrial Tribunal rejected DTC’s approval application on 17 May 2001, holding that the evidence of the checking staff was hearsay and that passenger Ramesh Kumar had not supported DTC’s allegations during the enquiry.

DTC challenged that order in W.P.(C) 7657/2001, while Dalbir Singh sought implementation of the order by way of reinstatement and full back wages in W.P.(C) 7098/2001.

During the proceedings, Dalbir Singh died; he had also attained superannuation in 2013 and had received wages under Section 17B of the ID Act from 2005 until superannuation.

1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal was justified in refusing approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act on the ground that DTC had failed to establish a prima facie case of misconduct.

2. Whether non-examination of the passengers was fatal to DTC’s case, particularly where passenger Ramesh Kumar had been examined during the enquiry but had denied supporting the allegations.

3. Whether, notwithstanding the legal consequence of refusal of approval, the High Court should grant reinstatement and consequential benefits or award lump-sum compensation in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

Proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act are summary in nature and protect workmen from alteration of service conditions or punitive action during the pendency of an industrial dispute.

The Tribunal must examine whether the domestic enquiry was fair and consistent with natural justice and whether a prima facie case for dismissal is made out; it does not exercise the same jurisdiction as in a reference under Sections 10, 11(3), and 11-A of the ID Act: John D’Souza v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (2019) 18 SCC 47.

Non-examination of passengers is not invariably fatal to disciplinary proceedings, and the evidence of checking staff or passenger statements may in appropriate cases suffice: State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491.

However, where a passenger produced and examined in the enquiry expressly denies the allegations, and the employer fails to discredit that testimony, the evidentiary foundation of the charge may fail.

Refusal of approval under Section 33(2)(b) ordinarily renders the termination non-est and results in the workman being deemed to continue in service with consequential benefits; nevertheless, the High Court may mould relief in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

The Court upheld the Tribunal’s assessment that the domestic enquiry had been conducted fairly but that the enquiry officer’s findings were perverse because they were not supported by reliable evidence.

The checking staff had not witnessed the passengers boarding the bus or paying the fare, making their evidence regarding those facts hearsay.

Although passenger examination is generally unnecessary, passenger Ramesh Kumar had been examined and had specifically stated that he boarded from U.P. Border, that the workman had not committed any mistake, and that he had not given the alleged written statement to the checking staff.

The enquiry officer rejected this evidence merely by conjecturing connivance, without recording a proper basis, and DTC did not impeach the passenger’s credibility.

The Court therefore held that the passenger’s evidence undermined the foundation of DTC’s case and that no prima facie case for dismissal had been established.

The absence of any verification of the workman’s cash collection further weakened DTC’s allegations.

Given the passage of more than 25 years, the workman’s superannuation in 2013, and his subsequent death, the Court considered monetary compensation more appropriate than ordering actual reinstatement.

Although refusal of approval ordinarily made the termination non-est and entitled the workman to consequential benefits, the Court moulded the relief because the workman had superannuated and died during the proceedings.

Since he had already received wages under Section 17B until superannuation, the Court directed DTC to pay an additional lump-sum compensation of ₹3,00,000.

Both writ petitions and the pending application were disposed of accordingly.