Section 33(2)’s sixty-day disposal timeline is directory, not mandatory, for Rent Authorities and Tribunals.

The petitioner approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 227 seeking a direction to the Rent Authority/Additional District Magistrate, Trans Gomti, Lucknow, to expeditiously decide Case No. 4362 of 2025, Smt. Smita Wadhawan v. Smt. Rani Singh, preferably within the period prescribed under Section 33(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 (“Act of 2021”).

Since the Court proposed to dispose of the petition without affecting the private respondent’s rights, notice to the respondent was dispensed with.

The petitioner contended that the time limit under Section 33(2) of the Act was mandatory and that the requested direction should therefore be issued.

Whether the sixty-day period prescribed under Section 33(2) of the Act of 2021 for disposal of a case or appeal by the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal is mandatory or directory?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Rent Authority to decide the pending proceedings within the statutory period under Section 33(2) or Section 33(7) of the Act?

Section 33(1) of the Act prescribes the procedure before the Rent Authority and Rent Tribunal, while Section 33(2) provides that proceedings should be disposed of expeditiously, within sixty days, and requires written reasons where disposal is not possible within that period.

Section 33(7) separately requires specified applications under Sections 21(2) and 22 to be decided within ninety days.

The Court applied the principle that statutory time limits imposed on public authorities for performance of public functions are ordinarily directory unless the statute specifies consequences for non-compliance, as stated in Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, (2003) 2 SCC 577.

It further relied on Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank, (2002) 6 SCC 33, and P.T. Rajan v. T.P. Sahir, (2003) 8 SCC 498, for the rule that the use of “shall” is not conclusive and that procedural time limits imposed on statutory functionaries may be directory where no penal consequence or prejudice follows.

The Court held that the proviso to Section 33(2) itself contemplates continuation of proceedings beyond sixty days, provided the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal records reasons in writing for the delay.

This statutory mechanism demonstrates that expiry of the sixty-day period does not terminate the jurisdiction to proceed or render the subsequent proceedings invalid.

Applying the principle that a time limit governing a public functionary is ordinarily directory, particularly where the statute prescribes no consequence for non-compliance, the Court rejected the petitioner’s submission that Section 33(2) was mandatory.

The provision was treated as a legislative direction for expeditious disposal rather than an inflexible limitation that would compel the Court to issue the requested mandamus merely because the prescribed period had elapsed.

Consequently, the petition was dismissed insofar as it sought a direction compelling disposal within the statutory period, with no order as to costs.

Nevertheless, considering the facts of the case and the petitioner’s age, the Court observed that the concerned Rent Authority was expected to decide the pending application/case expeditiously and in accordance with law.