Section 4 Limitation Act applies only to prescribed periods, not discretionary condonable periods under IBC.

The Appellants challenged an order of the Adjudicating Authority dated 26.03.2025, which approved a Resolution Plan

The impugned order was uploaded by the Tribunal on 27.03.2025

Under Section 61(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the 30-day limitation period for filing an appeal expired on 25.04.2025

The Appellants e-filed the appeal on 11.05.2025, which was the 46th day from the date of the order

The Tribunal’s vacation commenced on 01.05.2025

The Appellants filed a condonation of delay application (IA No. 1100/2025), arguing that since the 15-day discretionary extension period under the proviso to Section 61(2) fell during the vacation, they were entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to file upon the reopening of the court

1. Whether the 15-day discretionary period provided under the proviso to Section 61(2) of the IBC constitutes the "prescribed period" of limitation for the purposes of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963

2. Whether the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act is available to an appellant when the court vacation commences during the 15-day condonable period rather than the 30-day prescribed period

The court primarily applied Section 61 of the IBC, which prescribes a 30-day limitation for appeals and restricts the Appellate Tribunal’s power to condone delay to a maximum of 15 additional days

It further relied on Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows a proceeding to be instituted on the day a court reopens if the "prescribed period" expires during a court closure

The Tribunal followed the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Tata Steel v. Raj Kumar Banerjee (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1042) and Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd., which established that "prescribed period" under Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act means only the statutory period of limitation and does not include the discretionary period extendable by a court

Additionally, per V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd., limitation under the IBC runs from the date of pronouncement, and the "time requisite" for a certified copy can only be excluded if such a copy was applied for before the limitation expired

The Tribunal observed that the 30-day "prescribed period" expired on 25.04.2025, a date on which the court was fully functional, as the vacation did not begin until 01.05.2025

The court reasoned that the "prescribed period" refers strictly to the initial 30 days stipulated by Section 61(2), while the subsequent 15 days is a "condonable period" granted at the Tribunal's discretion upon showing sufficient cause

Applying the ratio in Tata Steel, the Tribunal held that Section 4 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to extend a discretionary period; it only protects litigants whose statutory limitation expires during a closure

Since the appeal was e-filed on the 46th day, it exceeded the maximum permissible 45-day window (30+15)

The court further noted that the Appellants had not even applied for a certified copy of the order, thus failing to demonstrate the diligence required to seek any exclusion of time under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act

It concluded that Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the 15-day grace period under Section 61(2) of the IBC

The application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the Company Appeal was dismissed accordingly