Section 47 CPC permits execution challenges only to a decree’s nullity or jurisdictional infirmity.

The respondent obtained a decree dated 22 August 2019 against the petitioner and another defendant for ₹10,65,965, with interest at 9% per annum, in a suit concerning unpaid rent and other dues.

In the execution proceedings, the petitioner applied under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC, contending that the decree was unenforceable against him under Section 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, that the suit was time-barred, and that the decree had been obtained by fraud.

The Executing Court dismissed the application on 3 August 2022.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227; the High Court stayed execution pending the petition.

Whether the Executing Court rightly dismissed the petitioner’s objections under Section 47 read with Section 151 CPC, including his contention that Section 8 of the Societies Registration Act barred execution against him personally.

Whether the decree could be challenged in execution on the grounds that the underlying suit was time-barred or that the decree had been obtained by fraud.

Section 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 provides that a judgment against a person or officer sued on behalf of a society is to be enforced against the society’s property, rather than against that person or officer personally.

Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a three-year limitation period for a suit for arrears of rent; the Court treated the cause of action as arising on dishonour of the petitioner’s cheques.

Under Section 47 CPC, an executing court cannot go behind a decree and may entertain an objection to execution where the decree is a nullity, including for jurisdictional infirmity; an erroneous decree remains binding unless set aside in appropriate proceedings.

The Court relied on Brakewel Automotive Components (India) (P) Ltd. v. P.R. Selvam Alagappan and the principle stated in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman.

A decree alleged to have been procured by fraud may be challenged on that basis, but the allegation must be substantiated.

The Court found that Section 8 did not protect the petitioner because the suit and decree treated him as personally liable, including on the basis of six cheques drawn on his personal account; he was not sued solely in a representative capacity on behalf of the society.

The Court further held that the suit, filed on 7 September 2018, was within three years of the cheques’ dishonour on 5 October 2015.

The fraud allegation was unsupported by material, and the decree had not been appealed or otherwise set aside.

Applying the limits of Section 47 CPC, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s objections did not establish that the decree was a nullity or otherwise inexecutable.

It dismissed the petition and pending applications, vacated the interim stay, and requested the Executing Court to proceed with execution in accordance with law.