Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to Rule 23 revisions absent express exclusion.

The appellant, a police constable, was dismissed from service on the allegation of remaining absent without leave, by order dated 30 November 2004.

His statutory appeal was dismissed, following which he filed a revision under Rule 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991.

The revision was filed approximately one and a half years after the appellate order and was rejected as time-barred by the Inspector General of Police, Meerut, on 22 August 2006.

The appellant’s writ petition challenging that rejection was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the reasoning that Rule 23 prescribed a three-month limitation period and did not confer power to condone delay.

The present intra-Court appeal was filed with a delay of 61 days, which was condoned by the Division Bench.

Rule 23(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 provides a three-month period for filing a revision against rejection of an appeal and permits suo motu examination of appellate orders where no revision has been preferred.

Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 attracts Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, to proceedings governed by a special or local law unless their applicability is expressly excluded.

Section 5 permits admission of an application after expiry of the prescribed period where sufficient cause for the delay is shown.

Relying on Superintending Engineer, Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar, (2020) 17 SCC 692, the Court held that Section 5 applies where the special statute prescribes limitation but does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act or impose an absolute outer limit for condonation.

The Court held that Rule 23 neither expressly excludes the Limitation Act nor restricts the period within which delay may be condoned.

The three-month period was therefore not an inflexible or jurisdictional bar.

The first proviso to Rule 23(1), permitting the Revising Authority to act suo motu where “no revision has been preferred,” demonstrated that the revisional scheme contemplated action even after expiry of the ordinary three-month period.

Consequently, Section 29(2) attracted Section 5 of the Limitation Act, giving the Revising Authority power to condone delay upon sufficient cause.

The learned Single Judge’s contrary view—that the absence of an express condonation provision made the limitation absolute—was held to be an error of principle.

Since the revision had been filed in 2006 and nearly twenty years had elapsed, and the State had shown no special circumstance opposing condonation, the Division Bench considered it unnecessary to remit the question of delay separately.

The intra-Court appeal and the writ petition were allowed; the Single Judge’s order dated 8 May 2026 and the Revising Authority’s order dated 22 August 2006 were set aside.

The matter was remitted to the Revising Authority to hear and decide the revision on merits, treating the delay as condoned, preferably within three months by a reasoned and speaking order.