Section 5 requires liberal condonation of delay absent proven negligence or lack of bona fides.

The respondent’s civil suit (RCS No. 159 of 2021) was dismissed by the Third Civil Judge, Class II, Datia, on January 8, 2024

The respondent filed a Regular Civil Appeal on July 4, 2024, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of approximately five months

The respondent contended that his counsel failed to inform him of the dismissal and that he only learned of the judgment on July 1, 2024, when the petitioner obstructed him while he was cultivating his field

The petitioner contested the application, arguing the respondent had knowledge of the case as the same counsel represented him in another pending matter (MJC No. 52 of 2022)

The Appellate Court (Principal District and Sessions Judge, Datia) allowed the application and condoned the delay.

The petitioner challenged this order under Article 227 of the Constitution

1. Whether the Appellate Court acted within its jurisdiction and sound discretion in condoning the five-month delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act

2. Whether the lack of communication from a counsel constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay when the litigant is illiterate and lacks 19th-century bona fides

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which grants courts wide discretion to condone delay if "sufficient cause" is shown

The court emphasized the principle that courts should adopt a lenient and justice-oriented view unless the delay is characterized by a lack of bona fides or gross negligence

The court exercised its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which limits interference to orders that are perverse or contrary to the legal position

The High Court observed that the respondent is illiterate and derived no benefit from filing the appeal belatedly

While the petitioner argued that the respondent shared the same counsel in other proceedings, the court noted that the respondent had not appeared in person since January 5, 2024, meaning he had no opportunity to meet his counsel and receive updates

the court found that the petitioner failed to refute the factual claim that he himself was the one who informed the respondent of the suit's dismissal on July 1, 2024

The court distinguished the precedents cited by the petitioner (N. Prakash v. M/s Consolidated Carpet Industries Ltd and Saurendra v. Bhugani & Anr.) on the grounds that those cases involved significantly longer delays (over two years) and clear negligence

the court held that the Appellate Court's decision was a just exercise of discretion aimed at dispensing justice

The court concluded that the respondent had shown sufficient cause for the five-month delay

The petition was dismissed in limine