Section 60 Disaster Management Act complaint requirements are distinct from Section 195 CrPC requirements.

The petitioner, owner of the second floor and roof rights at property Nos. 1961–1964, Katra Shahan Shahi, Chandni Chowk, maintained that the work undertaken there was repair and maintenance and did not require a building permit.

After the North DMC issued a work-stop notice on 8 April 2021, a police officer allegedly found labourers working at the property on 28 April 2021, during the COVID-19 lockdown.

An FIR was registered under Sections 188, 269 and 34 IPC, Section 344 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (DMC Act), and Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 (DMA). The investigation included municipal notices and orders, witness statements and seizure of construction tools; a chargesheet was filed and cognizance taken.

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR, chargesheet and consequential proceedings under Section 482 CrPC read with Section 528 BNSS.

1. Whether the allegations and material on record warranted quashing of proceedings under Sections 188 and 269 IPC.

2. Whether the proceedings under Section 51 DMA could continue without establishing compliance with the complaint requirements in Section 60 DMA.

3. Whether the proceedings under Section 344 DMC Act could continue without satisfying the statutory requirements in Section 467(a), and whether the alleged work fell within Section 344(1).

The Court applied the principles governing inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS: the power is to be exercised sparingly, and the Court does not determine the truth of allegations or conduct a detailed assessment of evidence at the quashing stage.

Under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC requires a written complaint by the public servant concerned or an administratively superior public servant.

Section 60 DMA imposes a distinct restriction on cognizance of offences under that Act, requiring a complaint by an authorised authority or officer, or compliance with the prescribed notice procedure.

Section 269 IPC concerns an unlawful or negligent act that the accused knows or has reason to believe is likely to spread a disease dangerous to life.

Section 344(1) DMC Act empowers the Commissioner to direct stoppage of unauthorised or non-compliant building work; under Section 467(a), prosecution for an offence under Section 344 requires a complaint by, or information from, a qualifying Corporation officer.

The Court held that the State’s assertion that a complaint under Section 195 CrPC had been obtained from the Assistant Commissioner of Police satisfied the procedural requirement for the Section 188 IPC proceedings.

The allegations that labourers worked during the lockdown could, if contrary to applicable directions and in circumstances likely to spread infection, prima facie attract Section 269 IPC; the petitioner’s claim that the work was only repairs did not justify quashing at this stage, and the required knowledge and likelihood were matters for evidence.

By contrast, the record did not establish whether a complaint satisfying Section 60 DMA had been filed or whether its complainant was authorised.

Nor could the Court determine from the competing assertions whether the work required municipal sanction or whether the prosecution met Section 467(a) DMC Act; those matters required examination of the original record.

It remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration of the proceedings under Section 51 DMA and Section 344(1) DMC Act, including examination of the complaints, the complainants’ authority, compliance with Sections 60 DMA and 467(a) DMC Act, and the nature of the alleged work.

The Trial Court was directed to pass a fresh speaking order of cognizance, uninfluenced by the High Court’s observations.

The petition was disposed of accordingly.