Section 90 presumption of due execution applies to original documents, not certified copies.

The plaintiffs instituted a suit for redemption of mortgaged property, asserting that their predecessor, Kanshi Ram, had mortgaged the property to the defendants and that the mortgage stood discharged from the profits of the property.

The defendants contended that Kanshi Ram had subsequently agreed to sell the property, received consideration, and executed a registered sale deed dated 02.02.1968 in their favour; they also claimed continuous possession and substantial improvements to the property.

The Trial Court accepted the defendants’ case, relying principally on the registered sale deed and holding that the plaintiffs had lost title; the suit was accordingly dismissed.

The First Appellate Court reversed that decision, finding that the sale deed described the property only by boundaries and that the defendants had failed to establish that it related to the suit property.

The defendants preferred a regular second appeal, which was admitted on three substantial questions of law.

Whether the First Appellate Court erred in law by disregarding the alleged admission of the plaintiff that the defendants were absolute owners in possession of the disputed property since 1968?

Whether the First Appellate Court erred in holding that the sale deed had not been duly proved and was not connected with the suit property?

Whether the jamabandies and mutation-related entries established the defendants’ title and interest in the suit property?

An admission must be read as a whole and cannot be selectively relied upon by accepting only the inculpatory portion; this principle was drawn from Mohd. Koya v. Muthukoya, following Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab and Dadarao v. State of Maharashtra.

An admission by itself does not create or confer title to immovable property, as held in Canbank Financial Services Ltd. v. Custodian and Kanhirakottil Mani v. Madhavi.

Under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, the presumption regarding due execution of a document more than thirty years old applies to the original document, not ordinarily to a certified copy; the principle was stated in Lakhi Baruah v. Padma Kanta Kalita and followed in Iqbal Basith v. N. Subbalakshmi.

Where immovable property is described by boundaries rather than khasra numbers, the party relying on the deed must establish by evidence that those boundaries correspond to the suit property.

Revenue entries and mutations do not, by themselves, confer title, and the evidentiary value of jamabandi entries must be assessed with reference to the underlying mutation proceedings.

The plaintiff’s statement that the defendants were owners in possession could not be treated as an unequivocal admission of title because it was qualified by the statement that they were residing in the property; the admission therefore had to be read as a whole.

In any event, the statement could not independently confer title upon the defendants, title being required to be established through a legally valid conveyance.

Although the defendants produced a certified copy of the registered sale deed through an official from the Sub-Registrar’s office, such production did not attract the Section 90 presumption of due execution applicable to the original document.

More importantly, the sale deed described a building by specified boundaries but did not mention the relevant khasra number, and the defendants led no evidence connecting those boundaries with the suit property.

The deed also described the building as free from encumbrances, whereas the plaintiffs’ case concerned mortgaged property.

The jamabandi entries referring to redemption and sale through mutations Nos. 1147 and 1146 were unsupported by witness testimony, were inconsistent with the defendants’ pleaded case, and the underlying mutation records were not produced.

Accordingly, the First Appellate Court was justified in finding that the defendants had failed to prove title to the suit property.

The alleged admission did not confer title; the certified copy of the sale deed was insufficient to establish due execution under Section 90 of the Evidence Act and, in any event, the deed was not connected with the suit property; and the jamabandi and mutation-related entries did not establish the defendants’ title.

The regular second appeal was dismissed, the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court were upheld, and any pending applications were also disposed of.