Section 94(2)(i) permits determining a victim’s age from any school-issued birth certificate.

The appellant was prosecuted for allegedly subjecting the informant’s physically handicapped minor daughter, born on 16 July 2008, to repeated sexual intercourse.

The principal incident occurred on 12 April 2020, when the victim stated that the appellant took her into a bathroom, threatened her with a dagger, and sexually assaulted her; her grandmother allegedly arrived after hearing her cries and saw the victim in a naked condition.

The FIR was lodged by the victim’s father on 20 May 2020, approximately 38 days after the principal incident.

The prosecution attributed the delay to threats, an attempted settlement by the appellant’s family, and the COVID-19 lockdown.

The victim’s school certificate and admission register recorded her date of birth as 16 July 2008; she had been admitted to the concerned school in Class III in 2017.

The medical examination recorded absence of the hymen.

The Special Judge, Bongaigaon, convicted the appellant under Section 376(3) IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him to 22 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹50,000.

The appellant challenged both the conviction and sentence.

1. Whether the delay of approximately 38 days in lodging the FIR created a reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case.

2. Whether the victim’s age was proved to be below 18 years on 12 April 2020, particularly when the medical opinion estimated her age at 15–17 years and the school record originated from a school she joined in Class III rather than the first school attended.

3. Whether the victim’s alleged consent or the existence of a consensual relationship could exonerate the appellant if she was a minor.

4. Whether the sentence of 22 years’ rigorous imprisonment required modification in light of the appellant’s age at the time of the offence.

The Court applied Section 376(3) IPC, which prescribes punishment for rape of a girl below 16 years, read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 42 of the POCSO Act concerning the applicable punishment.

Section 94(2)(i) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 permits age determination primarily through the date-of-birth certificate issued by a school or a matriculation/equivalent certificate; medical age determination is resorted to only in the absence of such documents.

The Court relied on R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266, for the principle that a statement under Section 164 CrPC may be used for corroboration and contradiction.

It considered Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand, (2008) 13 SCC 133, P. Yuvaprakash v. State, 2023 0 Supreme (SC) 641, and Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp 1 SCC 604, concerning proof of age and the evidentiary value of school records.

The Court held that, under Section 94(2)(i), the statute does not restrict reliance to the certificate or register of the first school attended.

It further applied the principle that a minor cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse for purposes of the statutory offence.

The Court found that the delay in lodging the FIR was satisfactorily explained by the appellant’s family’s assurance of settlement, threats, and the lockdown prevailing during the relevant period; the delay therefore did not discredit the victim’s account.

The victim’s testimony was materially corroborated by her prompt disclosure to her mother, father, and grandmother, the grandmother’s account of seeing her immediately after the incident, the Section 164 CrPC statement, and the medical finding that the hymen was absent.

On age, the Court preferred the school certificate supported by the 2017 admission register, both recording the date of birth as 16 July 2008, over the medical estimate.

It held that Section 94(2)(i) does not require reliance only on the record of the first school attended and that the contemporaneous 2017 entry could not reasonably have been fabricated in anticipation of the 2020 offence.

Consequently, the victim was 12 years old on the date of the offence.

Even if earlier acts appeared consensual, such consent had no legal effect because the victim was a minor.

The conviction under Section 376(3) IPC read with Section 4 POCSO was therefore sustained.

However, considering that the appellant was approximately 18–19 years old at the time of the offence, the Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimum.

The Court upheld the appellant’s conviction under Section 376(3) IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, rejecting the challenges based on FIR delay, age determination, and alleged consent.

The sentence was reduced from 22 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a ₹50,000 fine and one year’s default imprisonment to 20 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000, and one month’s simple imprisonment in default of payment.

The appeal was accordingly disposed of and the trial court record was directed to be returned.