01Facts
The petitioner was appointed as a Peon on 19 January 2004 on a fixed salary of ₹1,500 for five years and, by August 2005, was placed in the pay scale of ₹4,440–7,440.
p. 1 · ¶ 2Following implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission with effect from 1 January 2006, the scale was revised to the pay band of ₹5,200–20,200 with Grade Pay of ₹1,900.
p. 1 · ¶ 3Subsequently, the State’s Finance Department Resolution dated 27 February 2009 fixed the entry-level basic pay of employees appointed on or after 1 January 2006 at ₹7,730 plus Grade Pay of ₹1,900.
p. 1 · ¶ 3Consequently, employees junior to the petitioner received higher basic pay than him.
p. 1 · ¶ 4The petitioner therefore sought stepping up of his pay to ₹7,730 in the relevant pay band with effect from 1 January 2006, relying on the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Special Civil Application No. 12207 of 2014 and allied matters.
pp. 1, paras 2–402Issues
i.Whether the petitioner, appointed before 1 January 2006, was entitled to have his pay stepped up to the level of his juniors appointed on or after that date who were drawing higher basic pay.
pp. 1, paras 2–3ii.Whether the petitioner was similarly situated to the employees who received relief in Special Civil Application No. 12207 of 2014 and allied matters, so as to claim the same consequential benefits.
pp. 8, paras 7–803Law Applied
The Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to correct the pay anomaly.
It applied the principle of “stepping up of pay,” under which a senior employee in the same cadre and post may have his pay raised to that of a junior when the junior, appointed or promoted later, receives higher pay due to the operation of revised pay rules.
The Court relied on the conditions governing stepping up under the Government Resolution dated 8 May 1970, including identity of cadre and post, identical pay scales, and the existence of an anomaly attributable to the relevant pay-fixation provisions.
pp. 4–5It followed the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Special Civil Application No. 12207 of 2014 and allied matters, which held that such anomalies must be removed where juniors appointed on or after 1 January 2006 received higher entry-level pay.
pp. 2–3, 7The Court also relied on Maganbhai Arjanbhai Vegda v. State of Gujarat, the principle stated in Gurcharan Singh Grewal that a senior should not draw less salary than a junior, and the Division Bench decision in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1349 of 2012 concerning stepping up within the same cadre and post.
pp. 4–704Reasoning
The Court found that the petitioner had been appointed substantially earlier than the employees who received the higher entry-level pay under the 27 February 2009 Resolution, yet was drawing a lower basic pay of ₹7,100 while his juniors were placed at ₹7,730.
pp. 1–2 · ¶ 5Since the alleged disparity arose from the implementation of the revised pay structure and involved employees in the same cadre and post, the Court treated it as a pay anomaly attracting the principle of stepping up rather than as a claim for a fresh higher-pay-scale benefit.
pp. 6–7The reasoning in Special Civil Application No. 12207 of 2014 and allied matters was therefore applicable.
However, because the employees concerned had served in different districts, the State was permitted to verify the limited factual question of whether the petitioner was identically or similarly situated to the beneficiaries of those decisions.
pp. 8, paras 7–805Holding
The petition was allowed.
p. 8 · ¶ 8The State was permitted to verify whether the petitioner was identically or similarly situated to the petitioners in Special Civil Application Nos. 12207 of 2014 and 14704 of 2025.
p. 8 · ¶ 8If the verification was affirmative, the respondents were directed to step up the petitioner’s pay to ₹7,730 in the pay band of ₹5,200–20,200 with effect from 1 January 2006 and to grant all consequential benefits arising from the pay revision.
p. 8 · ¶ 8The entire exercise was to be completed within 16 weeks from receipt of the writ of the order.
p. 8 · ¶ 8Rule was made absolute and direct service was permitted.
p. 8 · ¶ 8Original Court PDF
PRAFULBHAI THOMASBHAI MACWANvsSTATE OF GUJARAT
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