Seniority determination was left subject to the larger Bench’s resolution of the N.R. Parmar–Meghachandra conflict.

The applicant, initially appointed as an Assistant Assay Superintendent in the Assay Department, I.G. Mint, Mumbai, on 13 April 1989, was declared surplus following corporatisation of the unit.

After opting to continue in Government service, he was redeployed to the Income Tax Department against available vacancies and joined as an Inspector of Income Tax on 14 October 2010 pursuant to the appointment memorandum dated 23 September 2010.

The applicant claimed that his seniority ought to be determined in accordance with Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, particularly by reference to the recruitment process and vacancies of 2009, rather than from his joining date in the Income Tax Department.

The respondents contended that, under the applicable DoP&T instructions and the terms of the appointment order, surplus employees were fresh entrants in the recipient organisation, with seniority reckoned from the date of selection/redeployment or joining, and that the applicant was correctly placed in the 2010–11 recruitment year.

Whether the applicant, having been redeployed as surplus staff into the Income Tax Department, was entitled to seniority with reference to the 2009 vacancies/recruitment process under the principles laid down in N.R. Parmar, rather than from the date of his appointment or joining in the recipient organisation

Whether the applicant’s seniority was required to be determined under the rules applicable to surplus employees and the specific conditions of his appointment order, which treated him as a fresh entrant and placed him below existing Inspectors in the Tamil Nadu Region

Whether the Tribunal should adjudicate the seniority claim before the Supreme Court resolved the referred conflict between N.R. Parmar and K. Meghachandra Singh

The Tribunal considered Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, under which the Original Application was filed.

It examined the seniority principle in Union of India v. N.R. Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, under which seniority of direct recruits may, in appropriate circumstances, be linked to the initiation of the recruitment process and the relevant recruitment year, including rotation or interspacing with promotees.

It also considered K. Meghachandra Singh v. Ningam Siro, (2020) 5 SCC 689, which generated an apparent conflict concerning the basis and timing of seniority, and the order in Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan Singh Rao, whereby the issue was referred to a larger Bench and seniority arrangements were made subject to the outcome of that proceeding.

The respondents relied on DoP&T O.M. No. 22011/7/86-Estt.(D) dated 3 July 1986, providing that surplus employees do not carry past-service seniority into the recipient organisation and are treated as fresh entrants for seniority and promotion.

They also relied on MHA O.M. No. 9/22/68-Estt. dated 6 February 1969 and O.M. No. 9/11/55-RPS dated 22 December 1959, under which seniority of redeployed surplus staff is linked to the date of selection for redeployment.

The Tribunal noted that the applicant’s claim depended substantially on the applicability and scope of N.R. Parmar, whereas the respondents relied on the special rules governing surplus-staff redeployment and the express conditions of the applicant’s appointment order.

However, the Tribunal considered it significant that the Supreme Court had referred the relevant conflict between N.R. Parmar and K. Meghachandra Singh to a larger Bench.

The Supreme Court’s reference order directed that seniority fixed on the basis of N.R. Parmar would remain subject to the final outcome of the appeal or reference and specifically included a matter concerning Income Tax Inspectors appointed for the 2009–10 recruitment year.

In view of that pending authoritative determination, the Tribunal declined to decide the applicant’s entitlement on merits and considered it appropriate to preserve the issue for determination in accordance with the eventual Supreme Court ruling.

Without expressing any opinion on the merits, it disposed of the Original Application by directing the respondents to pass an appropriate order in accordance with law, keeping in view the outcome of the proceedings in Hariharan v. Harsh Vardhan Rao, arising from SLP (C) No. 16161/2018.

The OA was accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.