Seniority of direct recruits must be counted from the initial date of joining, including prescribed training periods.

The dispute involves the inter-se seniority between Assistant Engineers (AE) recruited directly and those selected internally within the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB).

In December 2000 and March 2001, the Board appointed 300 AEs via direct recruitment.

Under Board Proceedings (BP) No. 35, these direct recruits were required to undergo two years of training on a consolidated pay before starting a two-year probation in a regular pay scale.

Internal selection was delayed because existing employees challenged the introduction of a written examination, obtaining an interim stay in December 2000.

Eventually, the Board dispensed with the exam for internal candidates via BP No. 59 (2001) and appointed them in May 2002.

By BP No. 9 dated 23.04.2002, the Board reduced the training period for direct recruits from two years to three months, designating them as regular AEs retrospectively from the completion of said three months.

The internal selectees challenged this, arguing that seniority should only count from the start of formal probation.

The Division Bench of the High Court set aside a Single Bench order, ruling that seniority for direct recruits should only commence from April 2002, effectively treating both groups as recruited in the same calendar year.

1. Whether the period of training undergone by direct recruits is to be included in "duty" for the purpose of determining the date of appointment and subsequent seniority.

2. Whether the seniority of direct recruits should be reckoned from their initial date of joining/training or from the date they commenced formal probation after training.

3. Whether the proviso to Regulation 97, regarding the 1:1 cyclic order of seniority for candidates recruited in the "same calendar year," applies when direct recruits joined in 2000-2001 and internal candidates were appointed in 2002.

The Court applied the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (Service Regulations), 1967.

Regulation 10(9) defines "Duty" to includes performing the duties of a post or undergoing prescribed probation or training.

Regulation 87(1) stipulates that a person is "appointed to a class of service" the moment they first discharge duties or commence prescribed probation, instruction, or training.

Regulation 97 states that seniority is determined by the rank in the list of approved candidates, and the date of commencement of probation is the date the individual joins duty.

The Court also referenced *R.S. Ajara v. State of Gujarat* and *State of H.P. v. J. L. Sharma* regarding the retroactive application of administrative decisions on seniority.

The Court held that the Division Bench erred by ignoring the plain language of the Service Regulations.

Under Regulations 10(9) and 87, "training" is explicitly categorized as "duty" and constitutes the commencement of "appointment to a class of service".

Therefore, the direct recruits entered the service on the date they joined for training in 2000 and 2001.

The Court reasoned that the internal selectees' argument—that seniority only starts with formal probation—would unfairly "wash off" the service rendered during training, despite the Regulations treating training as part of duty.

Furthermore, the Court found the proviso to Regulation 97 (regarding cyclic seniority) inapplicable because the two groups were not recruited in the same calendar year; the direct recruits were appointed in 2000-2001, distinct from the internal appointments in 2002.

The reduction of the training period via BP No. 9 was deemed an employer’s prerogative that affected only emoluments or status, but did not alter the fundamental date of entry into service for seniority purposes.

It held that the seniority of direct recruits must be counted from the first date of their joining for training, as training is legally recognized as "duty" and "appointment" under Regulations 10(9) and 87.

The Court reinstated the principle that seniority is governed by the merit rank at the time of recruitment and that the training period is irrelevant to the determination of the date of entry into the cadre.

All pending applications were disposed of.