Sentencing for Kidnapping Reduced to Period Undergone Where Minor Victim was a Consenting Party

The appellant was convicted by the Special Sessions Judge, Bhopal, on 25.02.2013 for the kidnapping of a prosecutrix (member of a Scheduled Tribe) under Section 363 of the IPC.

The prosecution alleged that on 06.01.2011, the appellant enticed the prosecutrix to Katni and Maihar, where he committed rape.

The Trial Court acquitted the appellant of charges under Section 376 IPC and the SC/ST Act, finding the victim (aged between 16 and 18) was a consenting party, but convicted him under Section 363 IPC for taking a minor from lawful guardianship.

The appellant, a first-time offender who had served approximately 2 years and 9 months in custody, challenged only the sentence, not the conviction.

1. Whether the substantive sentence of three years and six months RI under Section 363 IPC should be reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the appellant.

The court primarily applied Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which provides the punishment for kidnapping from lawful guardianship.

Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973, regarding the right of appeal against conviction.

The court relied on the principle of judicial discretion in sentencing, weighing the gravity of the offence against mitigating factors such as the lack of criminal antecedents, the duration of the trial (13 years), and the finding of "consenting party" in related but acquitted charges.

The Court observed that while the conviction under Section 363 IPC was proved as the appellant took the victim on the pretext of going to the market, several mitigating factors warranted a reduction in sentence.

The Court highlighted that the Trial Court had specifically recorded a finding that the victim was a consenting party, which led to the acquittal of the rape charge.

The Court noted the appellant’s status as a first-time offender, his cooperative conduct during the trial, and the fact that he had already remained in custody for a significant period of 2 years and 9 months.

Given that the proceedings had been pending for 13 years since 2013, the Court determined that the ends of justice would be met by a sentence of "period already undergone".

The appellant’s bail bonds were discharged, and the trial court's order regarding the disposal of property was affirmed. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.