Serious rape offences cannot be quashed under inherent jurisdiction solely on the basis of compromise.

The complainant alleged that the petitioner, whom she had met through Facebook, forcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse on two occasions—first at a hotel on 24 November 2022 and again in his car on 1 December 2022—and threatened to circulate an allegedly recorded obscene video if she approached the police.

She further alleged that the petitioner’s uncle threatened her when she disclosed the incidents.

On the basis of her complaint dated 31 January 2023, Crime No. 53/2023 was registered at Police Station Padav, Gwalior, for offences under Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 506 and 34 of the IPC.

During the proceedings, the petitioner sought quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS on the basis of a compromise.

The complainant supported the petition, and the Principal Registrar verified that the compromise was voluntary and free from threat, inducement or coercion.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash an FIR alleging rape and related offences on the basis of a subsequent compromise between the accused and the complainant.

Whether the complainant’s consent to the compromise alters the serious and heinous nature of the alleged offences under Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC so as to justify quashing of the criminal proceedings.

The Court applied Section 528 of the BNSS, which preserves the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the process of court; this power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and with circumspection.

Relying on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Court reiterated that heinous and serious offences having a social impact, particularly rape, ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have entered into a compromise.

The Court distinguished Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 614, and Ajay Mohan v. State of U.P., 2026 AHC 103624, where the circumstances included marriage and a settled marital relationship between the parties.

Although the compromise was voluntarily verified and the complainant supported quashing, the FIR prima facie disclosed allegations of repeated rape, criminal intimidation and related conduct.

The Court held that the petitioner had not married the complainant, unlike the factual circumstances in the authorities relied upon by him; therefore, those decisions did not assist his case.

Applying the principles governing Section 528 of the BNSS, the Court reasoned that rape is an offence against a woman’s bodily autonomy and dignity and is also an offence having a serious impact on society.

A subsequent compromise could not alter the character or gravity of the alleged offence, nor could it justify terminating the prosecution at the threshold.

It held that the alleged offences under Section 376 and related provisions were serious and heinous and could not be quashed merely on the basis of compromise.

The petition seeking quashing of Crime No. 53/2023 and consequential proceedings was accordingly dismissed.