Settlement and established family life justified quashing non-compoundable kidnapping proceedings in these circumstances.

FIR No. 270/2019 was registered at Police Station Shalimar Bagh under Sections 363 and 366 IPC after respondent no. 2’s father reported that she, then aged 16, had left home and could not be located.

The petitioner was arrested and later granted bail subject to a condition that he not contact respondent no. 2.

About a year later, respondent no. 2 voluntarily approached the petitioner, and they began living together.

At the time of the petition, they were aged 24 and 22, had two children, and stated that they had settled their dispute and were living together happily.

The criminal case remained pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class.

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings under Section 528 BNSS on the basis of settlement.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to quash proceedings for alleged offences under Sections 363 and 366 IPC on the basis of the parties’ settlement.

2. Whether quashing the proceedings in the circumstances would secure the ends of justice.

Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, preserves the High Court’s inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of a court or to secure the ends of justice; that power may be exercised even where an offence is non-compoundable.

Relying on Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Court reiterated that settlement-based quashing depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, requires consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence and the public interest involved, and is distinct from statutory compounding under Section 320 CrPC.

The Court considered that respondent no. 2 had voluntarily approached the petitioner after the initial events, that the parties had resumed cohabitation, and that they were now living together with two children.

It also noted that they were nearly the same age, with a two-year age difference, and that the State had no serious objection to quashing.

In these circumstances, the Court found that continuing the prosecution would serve no useful purpose and could disrupt their family life; quashing would therefore secure the ends of justice.

The pending application was also disposed of.