Slum dwellers have no fundamental right to insist on in-situ rehabilitation when alternate accommodation is offered.

The Petitioners, slum dwellers occupying structures situated wholly or partly on C.S. No. 782, Mazgaon Division, sought quashing of the Assistant Commissioner’s order dated 13 May 2026 and enforcement of undertakings dated 4 April 2007 and 12 March 2008, allegedly requiring the developers to rehabilitate eligible hutment dwellers in situ on the developers’ land.

A redevelopment scheme under Regulation 33(7) of the DCPR, 2034 was undertaken on the developers’ land. The Petitioners had earlier filed a civil suit seeking permanent alternate accommodation in that scheme, but the suit was dismissed for non-prosecution and was not restored.

The Municipal Corporation subsequently issued Annexure-II dated 4 September 2015, treating the Petitioners as eligible for rehabilitation by the Corporation, and allotted them permanent alternate accommodation in PAP tenements at Bhandup by letter dated 3 February 2026.

The Petitioners challenged the allotment and sought in-situ rehabilitation; their statutory appeal was rejected by the impugned order dated 13 May 2026.

Whether the Petitioners were entitled to insist upon in-situ rehabilitation on the developers’ land on the basis of the undertakings dated 4 April 2007 and 12 March 2008, despite Annexure-II identifying them for rehabilitation by the Municipal Corporation?

Whether the Assistant Commissioner’s order dated 13 May 2026 was arbitrary, non-speaking, or violative of the principles of natural justice?

Whether the High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, could adjudicate the disputed factual question concerning the location of the Petitioners’ structures and their entitlement to rehabilitation on the developers’ land?

Whether the Petitioners possessed a constitutional or enforceable legal right to in-situ rehabilitation at the developers’ land, rather than rehabilitation at an alternative location?

The Court exercised judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, under which disputed and fact-intensive claims ordinarily should not be adjudicated in writ proceedings where an adequate statutory or civil remedy is available.

It applied the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 and the redevelopment framework under Regulation 33(7) of the DCPR, 2034, distinguishing eligibility for rehabilitation from any right to rehabilitation on a particular parcel of land.

The Court relied on Abdul Majid Vakil Ahmad Patvekari & Ors. v. Slum Rehabilitation Authority & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 13719, holding that protection as a slum dweller and the right to rehabilitation do not create a right of ownership or an absolute right to in-situ rehabilitation on the same land.

The Court also held that promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation require a clear, enforceable representation or promise and could not assist the Petitioners on the material placed before it.

The Court found that Annexure-II dated 4 September 2015, which was not challenged, conclusively indicated that the Petitioners were eligible for rehabilitation by the Municipal Corporation.

The Corporation’s communication dated 12 September 2014 and the material produced by the developers showed that, out of 44 hutments, the majority—including the Petitioners’ structures—were to be removed and rehabilitated by the Corporation because they were situated wholly or predominantly on Corporation land.

The undertaking dated 12 March 2008 was therefore not construed as conferring an unconditional right upon every eligible hutment dweller to obtain in-situ rehabilitation on the developers’ land.

The Assistant Commissioner had considered the Petitioners’ contentions and recorded factual findings in a speaking order; consequently, no breach of natural justice or jurisdictional error was established.

The Court further held that the earlier civil suit involved substantially overlapping reliefs and that the present writ petition amounted to parallel proceedings or a “second bite at the cherry”.

Since the Petitioners were not denied rehabilitation but were offered completed PAP accommodation at Bhandup, the right to rehabilitation could not be converted into a right to rehabilitation at a particular location.

The alleged parity with another hutment dweller was rejected, particularly because the cited person’s similar writ petition was pending and no interim relief had been granted; the Petitioners’ failure to disclose that proceeding was also considered material.

The impugned order dated 13 May 2026 was found to be reasoned, based on relevant factual material, and not violative of natural justice.

The Petition was therefore disposed of without interference and without costs, while granting the Petitioners liberty to raise any permissible claims or counterclaims before the appropriate authority or court in accordance with law.