Solitary prosecutrix testimony supports rape conviction only when wholly reliable and of sterling quality.

The appellant, who was residing as a tenant in the informant’s house and providing tuition to the informant’s approximately 16-year-old daughter, was alleged to have induced her by promising marriage and forcibly established sexual relations with her on 25.06.1999.

A meeting was subsequently convened, where the appellant allegedly admitted his guilt and agreed to marry the victim. The victim thereafter stayed with the appellant for a few days, but the appellant allegedly left and later refused to marry her.

The informant lodged a written report on 10.07.1999, resulting in registration of Simdega P.S. Case No. 57 of 1999 under Sections 376, 420 and 379 IPC.

The trial court examined seven prosecution witnesses and convicted the appellant under Sections 376 and 420 IPC, sentencing him to seven years’ simple imprisonment under Section 376 and five years’ simple imprisonment under Section 420, with concurrent sentences; he was acquitted of the charge under Section 379 IPC.

The victim’s medical examination, conducted on 15.07.1999, found no external or internal injuries and no spermatozoa; the medical board assessed her age as between 16 and 17 years.

Whether the conviction of the appellant under Sections 376 and 420 IPC was sustainable on the evidence adduced by the prosecution?

Whether the victim’s evidence, viewed alongside the medical evidence, alleged promise of marriage, delay in lodging the FIR, and other inconsistencies, proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt?

Whether the alleged promise to marry constituted a false promise vitiating consent, or merely amounted to a subsequent breach of promise?

The court applied Sections 376 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and considered the pre-2009 legal framework under Section 375 IPC concerning consent and the age of consent.

It reiterated that conviction for rape may rest on the solitary testimony of the prosecutrix if that testimony is wholly reliable, trustworthy, unblemished and of “sterling quality”.

Relying on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, and the principle discussed in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675, the court held that a promise to marry vitiates consent only where the promise was false from its inception and was made with no intention to fulfil it; a mere subsequent breach of promise does not by itself convert consensual sexual intercourse into rape.

The High Court found that the victim’s testimony was not of the degree of reliability required to sustain conviction without dependable corroboration.

Her evidence contained material inconsistencies regarding the alleged inducement, the circumstances of the occurrence, and her subsequent cohabitation with the appellant.

She admitted that the appellant was already married and had children, that no promise of marriage had been made before 25.06.1999, and that she lived with him as husband and wife for three days after the alleged occurrence.

The court also noted that the medical examination disclosed no injuries or spermatozoa and described her as habituated to sexual intercourse, while the alleged Panchayat document or written confession was never produced in evidence.

The evidence of the sister and other witnesses was likewise affected by contradictions and omissions, including discrepancies between their trial testimony and their statements recorded during investigation.

In these circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish either forcible intercourse or a false promise to marry made with fraudulent intent at the inception.

The resulting doubt was held to be sufficient to negate the offences under Sections 376 and 420 IPC.

The judgment of conviction dated 31.01.2008 and order of sentence dated 05.02.2008 in Sessions Trial No. 97 of 2000 were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.

The appeal was allowed; as the appellant was on bail, he was discharged from the liability of his bail bond and his sureties were also discharged.