Specific performance requires proof of due execution; mere production of the agreement is insufficient.

The defendant claimed ownership of land measuring 1 Katha 17 Lechas at Khanapara, Guwahati, on which he had constructed an incomplete G+3 building.

The plaintiff alleged that, on 10 October 2013, the parties executed an agreement for sale for ₹1 crore, pursuant to which he paid ₹90 lakhs and obtained possession; the defendant was allegedly required to obtain sale permission and execute the sale deed but failed to do so.

The defendant denied executing the agreement, receiving the money, or delivering possession, alleging that the plaintiff had forcibly entered and dispossessed him in May 2014.

He filed a counterclaim seeking declaration of his title, a declaration that the agreement was forged and non-binding, and recovery of khas possession.

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit and partly allowed the counterclaim by holding the agreement dated 10 October 2013 void and non-binding, but declined to declare the defendant’s title.

Both parties appealed under Section 96 CPC: the defendant challenged the refusal to fully decree his counterclaim, while the plaintiff challenged dismissal of his suit.

1. Whether the plaintiff proved the execution and existence of a valid agreement for sale dated 10 October 2013 so as to claim specific performance?

2. Whether the plaintiff proved payment of ₹90 lakhs to the defendant as earnest money?

3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to fully decree the defendant’s counterclaim for declaration of title and consequential relief, despite the plaintiff’s admission of the defendant’s ownership?

The Court applied Section 96 CPC governing first appeals, and the principles under Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, under which specific performance requires proof of a valid and concluded contract, the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness, performance or substantial compliance with his obligations, and entitlement to equitable relief.

Relying on Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, (2019) 3 SCC 704, the Court held that proof of a valid contract is the foundational requirement for specific performance.

Under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act, the initial burden lies on the party asserting the existence of the contract; mere production of the document does not establish its due execution.

The Court relied on Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558, for the rule that the plaintiff must first establish his case.

Section 58 of the Evidence Act makes admitted facts unnecessary to prove, and judicial admissions in pleadings are binding and may independently found a decision, as explained in Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, AIR 1974 SC 471.

Although Section 73 permits comparison of disputed signatures, the Court held that such comparison would not cure the plaintiff’s failure to establish due execution through admissible evidence.

The Court also considered the defendant’s additional electronic copy of the sale deed under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and the certificate under Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.

The Court upheld the finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the agreement dated 10 October 2013.

The defendant specifically denied his signature and execution, while the plaintiff and PW-2 admitted that neither had seen the defendant sign the document.

The original agreement’s production was insufficient because its execution remained unproved; consequently, the plaintiff failed to establish the essential contractual foundation for specific performance.

The claim for payment of ₹90 lakhs also lacked reliable proof: the plaintiff did not produce relevant bank statements, admitted uncertainty regarding the amount paid on the alleged date of execution, and the money receipts relied upon were dated 12 January 2013 and 21 March 2013—months before the alleged agreement.

The Court therefore found no error in rejecting both the specific-performance claim and the claim based on payment.

As to the counterclaim, the plaintiff had expressly pleaded that the defendant was the “absolute owner and possessor” of the property; this judicial admission dispensed with the need for further proof of that fact.

In addition, the defendant’s e-copy of the 5 March 2012 sale deed was admitted in appeal under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, supported by the statutory certificate, and was not disputed by the plaintiff.

The trial court consequently erred in refusing to grant the defendant full relief on the counterclaim.

RFA No. 73/2019, filed by the defendant, was allowed.

The trial court’s partial rejection of the counterclaim was set aside, and the defendant’s counterclaim was decreed in full, including declaration of his right, title and interest and the consequential reliefs claimed.

The Court also discharged the Receiver appointed during the appeal proceedings.