Specific venue and exclusive jurisdiction clauses override default seat designations in institutional arbitration rules.

The parties entered into an Agreement on 25.05.2019 for the construction of a 4-lane elevated corridor in Jamshedpur

Following the termination of the Agreement in 2020, the Petitioner invoked arbitration

Earlier, in January 2021, the Petitioner filed a Section 9 petition before the Delhi High Court seeking interim protection, where an ex-parte status quo order was passed but the petition was subsequently withdrawn on the next date of hearing

An Arbitral Tribunal was later constituted under the Society for Affordable Redressal of Disputes (SAROD)

When the mandate of the Tribunal expired on 03.12.2023, the Petitioner filed the present petition under Section 29A(4) and (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act) in the Delhi High Court for extension

The Respondent raised a preliminary objection, arguing that only the courts at Ranchi possessed jurisdiction per Clause 27 (Exclusive Jurisdiction) and Clause 26.3(ii)(d) (Venue of Arbitration) of the Agreement

1. Whether the filing and subsequent withdrawal of a Section 9 petition before the Delhi High Court, without any adjudication on merits or jurisdiction, operates to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the said Court under Section 42 of the A&C Act.

2. Whether the juridical seat of arbitration is New Delhi by virtue of SAROD Arbitration Rules or Ranchi by virtue of the "Venue" and "Exclusive Jurisdiction" clauses in the Agreement.

The Court applied Section 42 of the A&C Act, which mandates that once an application is made to a "Court," that court alone has jurisdiction over all subsequent applications

The definition of "Court" under Section 2(1)(e) requires the forum to have subject-matter, territorial, and pecuniary competence

It relied on State of W.B. v. Associated Contractors, which held that Section 42 is triggered only if the first application is made to a court of competent jurisdiction

Regarding the "seat," the Court applied the principles from BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC and Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd., establishing that a designated "venue" coupled with an "exclusive jurisdiction" clause and no other contrary indicia signifies the juridical seat

Regarding the first issue, the Court held that Section 42 is not triggered by the "fortuitous, premature, or tactical filing" of an application

Since the previous Section 9 petition was withdrawn at a nascent stage without the Respondent having an opportunity to contest jurisdiction or the Court adjudicating upon it, there was no "real, effective, and legally sustainable" assumption of jurisdiction

On the second issue, the Court reconciled the conflict between the SAROD Rules (designating Delhi as the default seat) and the Agreement (designating Ranchi as the venue and conferring exclusive jurisdiction)

It reasoned that Rule 23.1 of the SAROD Rules is a default provision applicable only "unless otherwise agreed by the Parties"

The specific contractual stipulations in Clauses 26.3(ii)(d) and 27.1, designating Ranchi as the venue and vesting it with exclusive jurisdiction, override the general institutional rules

The Court emphasized that treating Delhi as the seat would render the Ranchi exclusive jurisdiction clause "nugatory" and "otiose"

Furthermore, as the cause of action arose in Ranchi and no part of the contract was performed in Delhi, Ranchi was the intended juridical focal point

On the second issue, it held that Ranchi is the juridical seat of arbitration, and the Delhi High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction

Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition as not maintainable, directing that any such application must be filed before the competent court in Ranchi