Standard rent applications for post-2001 constructions are not maintainable and liable for rejection under Order VII Rule 11.

The appellants (tenants) filed applications under Section 11(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 ("Rent Act") for fixation of standard rent after the respondent (landlord trust) issued notices for rent increase and termination of tenancy.

The subject shops were constructed and let out after the year 2001.

The landlord filed applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the tenant's applications, arguing that the remedy was otiose following the Supreme Court's decision in *Malpe Vishwanath Acharya*.

The Trial Court rejected the plaints, and the First Appellate Court confirmed this dismissal.

The tenants preferred these Second Appeals challenging the concurrent findings.

1. Whether an application filed for fixation of Standard Rent under Section 11(3) of the Rent Act falls within the purview of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for the purpose of rejection at the threshold?

2. Whether the provisions of the Rent Act regarding standard rent apply to premises constructed and let out after the Gujarat Amendment Act, 2001?

The Court applied Section 141 of the CPC, which extends the procedural framework of suits to all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

It relied on the definition of "pleadings" under Order VI of the CPC as formal documents setting forth claims or defenses.

Substantively, the Court applied Section 4(1A) of the Rent Act (as amended in 2001), which exempts premises constructed on or after the commencement of the Amending Act from the operation of the Rent Act.

It further followed the Constitutional principle from *Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra*, holding that continuing archaic standard rent provisions without amendment is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

and the principle from *Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers* regarding the Court's duty to terminate infructuous litigation.

The Court rejected the appellants' argument that a Section 11(3) application is not a "plaint" amenable to Order VII Rule 11.

By invoking Section 141 of the CPC, the Court determined that since the application initiates an adversarial adjudicatory process to determine substantive civil rights (standard rent), it partakes the character of a pleading.

On the merits, the Court found that because the shops were constructed after 2001, they were expressly exempted from the Rent Act under Section 4(1A).

Consequently, the tenants had no statutory right to seek fixation of standard rent.

The Court reasoned that allowing a proceeding to continue when the underlying law is inapplicable would be "flogging a dead horse" and an abuse of the judicial process.

The Court also noted that under the *Malpe Vishwanath* ratio, the unamended standard rent provisions lacked legal efficacy for new tenancies.

The Court answered the substantial question of law by affirming that such applications can be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or the Court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse of process.

All Second Appeals were dismissed, the concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld, and interim reliefs were discontinued.