Status Quo Preservation Prevails Over Alternate Monetary Relief in Specific Performance Suits Involving Immovable Property

The appellants entered into an agreement to sell with respondent No. 1 in 1998 for 7 kanals of land, paying a partial consideration of Rs. 70,000 and taking possession

The sale deed was deferred as the land was mortgaged to a bank

In May 2016, the appellants alleged they were forcibly dispossessed by respondent No. 3, who claimed ownership via a sale deed executed in 2014 by respondent No. 2 (acting as Power of Attorney for respondent No. 1)

The appellants filed a suit for specific performance and declaration of the 2014 sale deed as void

While the trial court initially granted a temporary injunction in 2016, it vacated the order on May 15, 2024, holding that the appellants could be adequately compensated by money or alternative land

1. Whether the availability of alternative relief such as compensation or damages is a bar to granting a temporary injunction in a suit for specific performance concerning immovable property

2. Whether the trial court erred in vacating the interim protection intended to preserve the subject matter of the suit and prevent the creation of third-party interests

The court applied Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding temporary injunctions

In suits for immovable property, preservation of the subject matter is paramount to prevent a decree from becoming illusory

Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) v. Baldev Dass (2004) to establish that alienation of property during trial should generally be prohibited to prevent irreparable loss and multiplicity of proceedings

Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi (2024), which clarifies that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (Doctrine of Lis Pendens) is not a total substitute for an injunction because subsequent bona fide purchasers for value can complicate the equities and the exercise of judicial discretion

The High Court found that the trial court’s reasoning—that the appellants had no right to an injunction because they could seek alternative land or interest—was flawed

The Court reasoned that in a suit for specific performance, the primary relief is the enforcement of the contract for a specific piece of land, and monetary compensation is not necessarily an adequate substitute

The Court observed that the respondents’ actions, specifically transferring property to a family member (sister-in-law) while a prior agreement existed, appeared intended to defeat the appellants' rights

It determined that if the property changed hands further, it would lead to a multiplicity of litigation and irreparable injury that damages alone could not remedy

Therefore, the balance of convenience required maintaining the status quo to protect the potential final decree

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated May 15, 2024. It directed the respondents not to create any third-party interest over the property in question until the final disposal of the suit