Statutory prescription of experience-based eligibility criteria for departmental promotion is a policy matter immune to judicial review.

The petitioners were appointed as Unarmed Police Constables in 2011-12 through a centralized recruitment process but were assigned to various districts on a random administrative basis.

Promotions within the police force are governed by district-wise seniority.

Consequently, batchmates in smaller districts secured faster promotions to Head Constable and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) than the petitioners.

An advertisement dated 26.06.2025 invited applications for the post of Unarmed Police Sub-Inspector (PSI) via Internal Departmental Examination.

Under Clause 2(b)(ii) of the 2020 Rules and Clause 3 of the 2024 Rules, eligibility requires either 5 years of service as an ASI/Head Constable or 15 years of combined service including the rank of Constable.

The petitioners, having less than 15 years of service and not yet promoted to Head Constable due to district stagnation, challenged these rules as arbitrary and discriminatory.

1. Whether Clause 2(b)(ii) of the Police Sub-Inspector (Unarmed) Class-III Recruitment Rules, 2020, is unsustainable, unreasonable, or manifestly arbitrary under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

2. Whether the disparity in promotional opportunities arising from district-wise seniority and fortuitous circumstances constitutes hostile discrimination.

Section 5(b) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, which empowers the State to frame recruitment rules.

The principle that prescription of eligibility criteria and promotional avenues is a policy matter within the executive's domain, as established in P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General and Union of India v. Pushpa Rani.

The doctrine that mere hardship or "fortuitous circumstances" in career progression do not render a rule unconstitutional, following Ajara Himmatkumar Naranbhai v. State of Gujarat and Rajeshbhai Chhaganbhai Chokhaliya v. Director General of Police.

The standard for "manifest arbitrariness" requires proving a provision is capricious or lacks a rational nexus to its object.

The court reasoned that the 15-year combined service criterion was an inclusive amendment (introduced in 2012) intended to widen the zone of consideration by including Constables, who were previously excluded.

The court rejected the claim of discrimination, noting that petitioners accepted district-cadre appointments and seniority lists with full knowledge.

Since employees in different districts do not form a "homogeneous class," faster promotion in one district over another is a fortuitous administrative fact, not legal discrimination.

Regarding the 15-year requirement, the court held that experience is vital for the supervisory and investigative duties of a PSI; the specific length of that experience is a policy choice that the judiciary cannot rewrite without empirical evidence of irrationality.

Finally, the court noted the petitioners’ 13-year delay in challenging the 2012 amendment, suggesting they only sued when the rules personally inconvenienced them.

The court held that promotion is not a fundamental right, only the right to be considered in accordance with valid rules.

The petitions were dismissed, and all interim reliefs permitting petitioners to participate in the examination were vacated.