Statutory presumption under Section 20 PC Act is not rebutted by a bare, unproven explanation of loan repayment.

The appellant, a Company Commander in the Delhi Home Guard, was accused of demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹100/- from PW3 (a Home Guard constable) on 28.10.1997 to assign him traffic duty.

Following a complaint by PW3, the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) conducted a trap operation where the appellant was apprehended after accepting tainted currency.

The trial court convicted the appellant on 11.08.2004 under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act), sentencing him to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine.

The appellant challenged the conviction, contending that the money was a loan repayment, that PW3 was on duty elsewhere during the trap, and that he lacked the authority to mark attendance.

1. Whether the prosecution successfully established the twin requirements of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.

2. Whether the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act by providing a probable defense of loan repayment.

3. Whether the alleged lack of authority to mark attendance or the presence of the complainant elsewhere vitiated the prosecution case.

The court primarily applied Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, which criminalize the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by public servants.

It relied on the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act, which mandates that once acceptance of gratification (other than legal remuneration) is proved, it is presumed to be for a motive or reward unless the contrary is proved.

The court cited State of Maharashtra v. Rashid B. Mulani (2006) and Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra (1964) to establish that a "mere explanation" is insufficient to rebut this presumption; rather, the accused must offer "proof" of a lawful transaction that is more than just a plausible story.

The Court found that the testimony of PW3 (complainant) and PW4 (independent witness) consistently proved that the appellant made a conscious demand for money ("jo kaam maine bola tha wo kaam ho gaya") and accepted the tainted notes.

This oral evidence was corroborated by the positive results of the phenolphthalein test on the appellant’s hands and shirt pocket.

Regarding the defense of loan repayment, the Court noted that the appellant failed to produce any documentary evidence or witnesses to substantiate the existence of a prior loan.

Following the principles in Rashid B. Mulani, the Court held that the burden of proof on the accused, while not as onerous as the prosecution's, requires establishing a "reasonable probability" through evidence, which the appellant failed to do.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed the argument regarding lack of authority, noting that even if a subordinate (Munshi) marked attendance, the appellant exercised overall control as a superior officer.

The Court held that the prosecution proved the foundational facts of demand and acceptance beyond reasonable doubt, and the appellant failed to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act with any credible evidence.

The Court concluded there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment.