Statutory remedies against closure reports must be exhausted before seeking writ jurisdiction for quashing of FIR.

The Petitioner, Master Devarsh (a minor), was delivered via emergency C-section on 12.08.2017 at Fortis Hospital, Shalimar Bagh

Despite a discharge summary stating "no neurological concern," the child was later diagnosed with "West Syndrome" caused by severe brain hemorrhage/hypoxic injury sustained during birth

The parents alleged medical negligence and concealment of records

Following a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., an FIR (No. 0480/2019) was registered under Sections 336/337 IPC

The doctors (Petitioners in W.P. (Crl.) 3537/2019) sought quashing of this FIR, relying on a Delhi Medical Council (DMC) report that found no negligence

During the pendency of these petitions, the police filed a Closure Report, to which the complainant filed a Protest Petition

Whether the investigation into the alleged medical negligence was being conducted fairly and whether an independent medical board was required.

Whether the FIR registered against the treating doctors was liable to be quashed in light of the "no negligence" finding by the Delhi Medical Council.

The court primarily applied the principles from Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005), which mandates that before proceeding against a doctor for negligence, the investigating officer must obtain an independent and competent medical opinion

It also referenced Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) regarding the necessity of a preliminary inquiry in medical negligence cases

Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015) concerning the judicial application of mind required under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

The Court observed that the initial grievance regarding the registration of an FIR had already been addressed by the Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

Regarding the doctors' plea for quashing, the Court noted that while they relied on the DMC report, the investigation had progressed to the point where the police filed a Closure Report

The Court found that since the complainant had already exercised the statutory remedy of filing a Protest Petition against the Closure Report, the matter was now within the competent jurisdiction of the trial court

Interference at this stage by the High Court would be premature and would "pre-empt the judicial determination" pending before the Magistrate

It held that since a Closure Report had been filed and a Protest Petition was actively being pursued by the complainant, the parties must seek their remedies before the trial court

All rights and contentions were left open for the parties to urge before the competent Court in accordance with law