Stepfather Helping Raise Girl Denied Joint Guardianship Because Her Mother Is Alive And Fit: Madras High Court

The second petitioner, the minor girl’s mother, and the first petitioner, her present husband and stepfather, sought a declaration that they were joint guardians of the child’s person.

The mother and respondent had been married; their marriage was dissolved by mutual consent while the mother was pregnant, and the divorce decree recorded that the respondent was not the unborn child’s father.

The child’s birth certificate names the respondent as her father.

The petitioners alleged that the respondent ceased contact when the child was about ten months old, while the first petitioner had since participated in her care.

The petitioners later remarried and have a younger daughter together.

The respondent did not appear and was set ex parte.

The Court obtained reports from legal aid counsel, a counsellor and a psychologist; those reports described the child as settled and emotionally attached to the petitioners.

Under Sections 7 and 15(1) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, a court may appoint or declare joint guardians where the applicable law permits, but that power is subject to the Act’s other restrictions.

Section 19(b), as amended, restricts appointment or declaration of a guardian of a minor’s person where a parent is alive and, in the court’s opinion, not unfit.

Under Section 6(b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the mother is the first natural guardian of a child born outside marriage; a stepfather is not included within “father” under the provision’s Explanation.

The child’s welfare is paramount under Section 17 of the Guardians and Wards Act and Section 13 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, but welfare does not itself make a legally unavailable appointment permissible.

Section 116 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, corresponding to Section 112 of the Evidence Act, was relevant to the child’s legitimacy; an assertion of an extramarital relationship alone does not prove non-access.

The Court also considered its protective jurisdiction under Clause 17 of the Letters Patent, preserved by Section 3 of the Guardians and Wards Act.

The mother was alive, fit, caring for the child and supportive of the petition. The Court held that her consent could not displace Section 19(b), and that the restriction could not be avoided by seeking appointment of the stepfather jointly with her.

The respondent’s absence did not establish the petitioners’ entitlement.

The child’s settled care and attachment to the first petitioner supported continuation of the existing arrangement, but caregiving did not confer guardianship status.

The Court declined to determine parentage or legitimacy, finding that question unnecessary to resolve the guardianship application.

It distinguished the prior guardianship order relied on by the petitioners because it had not addressed Section 19(b), and noted that the joint-custody direction in T.P. Vasanth v. R. Lakshmi Narasimhan had been modified by the Division Bench.

The Court further held that a guardianship order could not alter public-record entries or confer legal parentage.

The first petitioner may continue caring for the child with the mother’s concurrence, but any authorisation by the mother does not transfer guardianship or replace consent where the law requires that of a parent or legal guardian.

No continuing court-directed monitoring was ordered; the professional reports remain confidential, subject to lawful access and further court orders.

No order as to costs was made.