Storage of Child Pornography Without Transmission Constitutes a Punishable Inchoate Offence Under POCSO and IT Acts

The petitioner was the sole accused in a criminal proceeding arising from the forensic examination of his mobile phone, which had been seized in connection with a separate crime (Crime No. 1/2025)

Forensic experts discovered a plethora of pictures and videos depicting child pornography on the device

Consequently, a charge sheet was filed for offences under Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) and Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”)

The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Section 528 BNSS) to quash the proceedings in Spl.C.No.2119/2025, contending that mere possession without circulation does not constitute an offence

Whether the mere storage or possession of child pornographic material on a personal device, without evidence of transmission or circulation, attracts the rigours of Section 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the IT Act.

The court relied on Section 15 of the POCSO Act (as amended in 2019), which penalizes the storage of pornographic material involving a child

and Section 67B of the IT Act, which punishes the creation, possession, or browsing of child pornography in electronic form

It heavily applied the precedent in *Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish* (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611), which established that Section 15 of POCSO is an "inchoate crime" where the legislative intent is to punish the storage itself when accompanied by a specific intent, and that "possession" includes constructive possession and does not require actual transmission

The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that circulation is a prerequisite for prosecution.

Applying the *S. Harish* precedent, the Court noted that Section 15 of the POCSO Act is divided into three distinct categories—subsections (1), (2), and (3)—none of which require completed transmission to constitute an offence

The Court reasoned that storage with the failure to delete or report the material sufficiently indicates the requisite *mens rea* (intent to share or transmit) for an inchoate offence

Regarding the IT Act, the Court observed that Section 67B(b) specifically penalizes the act of "collecting, browsing, or downloading" such material

Since the forensic report confirmed the presence of explicit child pornography on the petitioner’s phone, the ingredients of the offences were prima facie satisfied

The Court held that since charges had already been framed and the case was at the stage of evidence, there was no warrant for interference under inherent powers

The petition was rejected, leaving the petitioner to face a full-blown trial