Strict proof of age is mandatory for POCSO convictions; school records based solely on parental affidavits are insufficient.

The Appellant was convicted by a Special POCSO Court for repeated penetrative sexual assault [s. 376(2)(n) IPC and s. 5/6 POCSO Act] and for being a proclaimed offender [s. 174A IPC]

The prosecution alleged the Appellant raped PW1, a minor aged approximately 17 years and 8 months, resulting in pregnancy

During the trial, the victim (PW1) testified that she was in a consensual relationship with the Appellant for four years and intended to marry him, but he married another woman

To prove the victim's minority, the prosecution relied on a school certificate [Ext. PW12/B] and an admission register [Ext. PW2/D] based on an affidavit by the victim's mother claiming a birth date of 03.03.2000

The court applied Section 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act, which require the victim to be a "child" (under 18)

It relied on Section 162 of the Cr.P.C., which prohibits the use of signed statements made to police during investigation as substantive evidence, a principle reiterated in Sasi v. State of Kerala

Furthermore, the court applied the "foundational facts" doctrine regarding the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, holding that the presumption of guilt only arises once the prosecution proves the victim’s minority

The Court found the evidence regarding the victim's age insufficient. It held that the birth certificate [Ext. PW2/B] issued by the School Principal to the IO was merely a signed statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and thus hit by the bar under Section 162 Cr.P.C., rendering it inadmissible

The Court noted that the school admission register entry [Ext. PW2/D] was based solely on a private affidavit by the mother rather than a verified birth register, making the age proof "not quite satisfactory"

Because the prosecution failed to prove the foundational fact of the victim's minority, the Court ruled that the Section 29 POCSO presumption could not be triggered

Regarding the IPC charges, the Court observed that PW1’s own testimony consistently described a long-term consensual relationship based on a promise to marry; since minority was not proven, consent was validly established, and the ingredients of Section 376(2)(n) were not met

The High Court allowed the appeal, acquitted the Appellant of the charges under Section 376(2)(n) IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii), 5(l), and 6 of the POCSO Act, and ordered his immediate release