### Subjective Satisfaction Regarding Maintenance of Public Order Cannot Be Based Solely on Isolated Criminal Antecedents Key Takeaway: The Detaining Authority cannot invoke preventive detention for "public order" based on single offenses manageable under ordinary criminal law.

The petitioner, Gopal Gediya, was classified as a "bootlegger" under Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA).

Following the registration of a single FIR on November 27, 2025, under Sections 65(A), 65(E), and 81 of the Prohibition Act at the DCB Police Station,

the Police Commissioner of Surat City issued a preventive detention order on February 5, 2026.

The petitioner challenged the legality of this detention, arguing it was passed mechanically without evidence that his actions disturbed public order.

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was detained in the Central Jail, Ahmedabad.

1. Whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law based on the materials available.

2. Whether the activities of the detenue, premised on a single criminal case, satisfy the threshold of being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".

The court applied Section 2(b) of the PASA Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger" as one who illegally manufactures, stores, or transports liquor.

It further interpreted Section 3 regarding the "maintenance of public order."

The court relied heavily on the precedent of *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which establishes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and is an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution.

The ruling also emphasized that when ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient remedies, the state should not resort to extraordinary preventive detention measures.

The Court examined the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and found it flawed.

It noted that the detention was based primarily on a single case registered under the Prohibition Act.

The bench reasoned that such an offense does not inherently possess the gravity required to demonstrate a disturbance of "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order".

Following the Supreme Court's mandate in *Dhanya M.*, the court observed that the law of preventive detention is a "hard law" that must be strictly construed and should not be used to "clip the wings" of an accused who could otherwise be dealt with under ordinary criminal procedures.

The court concluded that there was no nexus between the petitioner's alleged activities as a bootlegger and a breakdown of public tranquility.

Consequently, the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was deemed illegal and invalid.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated February 5, 2026, and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case.